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ABSTRACT 
 
Most history texts place the beginning of Japan’s colonial empire in 1895, with 
the acquisition of Formosa (now Taiwan) and Korea in 1910. The first Japanese 
experience with administering and developing a land not traditionally their own, nor 
inhabited by ethnically Yamato Japanese, however, might be found in the relatively 
inhospitable northern island of Hokkaido during the first half of the Meiji era (1868-
1912). Hokkaido can be viewed as a colonization laboratory, where the blueprints of the 
later Japanese Empire were initially developed. It was not solely by native Japanese 
knowledge that the exploration, research, development, and the creation of infrastructure 
in Hokkaido were undertaken, but by well-paid foreign advisors. These Westerners 
(including many Americans) surveyed and categorized the resources of Hokkaido, while 
testing which crops, animals, structures, and methods might help the economy of 
Hokkaido develop into a modern one. Particularly with the establishment of an institution 
such as Sapporo Agricultural College, the foreign advisors trained a new generation of 
Japanese capable of doing just the same. Hokkaido’s development and the treatment and 
acculturation of the colonized peoples of Hokkaido, the native Ainu, would prove an 
invaluable guide and underlying influence to the colonization of areas like Formosa, 
Sakhalin, and Korea. Additionally, while Hokkaido was initially not so easily tamed and 
some initial development efforts stalled out, both the successful work and the failures 
accomplished during the period of the 1870s to 1890s effectively laid the groundwork for 
permanent Japanese settlement on the island. The early development of Hokkaido was 
  vii 
therefore an important piece to Japan’s modernization and had far-reaching consequences 
for both Japanese imperialism and the Hokkaido of today. 
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A NOTE TO THE READER 
 
All quotations have been kept in their original forms. Spelling errors in the original 
source documents have been denoted by the use of “[sic]” where appropriate. Spellings in 
the British-English style (such as “colour”) have been left unformatted. 
 
The island of Hokkaido will be referred to as “Ezo” prior to 1869 and “Hokkaido” 
thereafter. Original sources use a variety of terms for the Ainu (Aino, Ainos, Ainu) and 
frequently refer to the island of Hokkaido by its former designation of Ezo, even after 
1869, and by various spellings (Yezo, Yesso, Yeso—“ye” is an archaic spelling and is 
pronounced “e” in modern Japanese). 
 
Hokkaido (sometimes written Hokkaidō) has been written without any accent mark, as 
has been the case in recent scholarship. Japanese terms have been used sparingly, though 
are italicized and defined when present in the text, unless they are organization names 
(such as the “Kaitakushi”) or words common in English (“samurai”). Less common 
Japanese words or lesser-known place names have been appropriately formatted with 
accent marks. 
 
The southern islands traditionally inhabited by the Japanese (Honshu, Kyushu, and 
Shikoku) are here referred to as the “mainland” of Japan, in comparison to the northern 
island of Hokkaido. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Few aspects of Japanese history are as intriguing to historians as Japan’s dramatic 
1868-1942 modernization. During this period, the Japanese created a modern state that 
stood equal to the powers of the West, industrialized its economy, and built one of the 
world’s largest empires. After its doors were forced open by the United States in 1853, 
Japan saw the end of the Tokugawa House’s rule (1600-1868), concluding the age of the 
samurai. What replaced Tokugawa power was a new government with the young Meiji 
Emperor at its head. Operating with the ambitious goal of first overthrowing the unequal 
treaties placed upon Japan by the imperial West, and then equaling Western economic, 
military, technological, and industrial power, Japan eventually succeeded in playing the 
West’s own game. By the end of the Meiji era (1868-1912), Japan had earned the respect 
of the West through its growing modern economy and defeat of Russia in the 1904-05 
Russo-Japanese war, the first non-Western country to win a war against a Western power 
in the industrial age. In the Taisho era (1912-26), Japan managed to stand as one of the 
five great powers at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference talks, where the fate of the post-
World War One world was to be decided. Finally, the Showa era (1926-89) saw Japan 
achieve the height of its power in 1942 and hold a vast empire that included much of 
Southeast and East Asia, before falling in the Second World War to the Allied Powers, 
led by the United States. After the war and with some U.S. influence, it remade itself as 
an economic world power. None of this, however, occurred in a vacuum. 
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 The role of the northernmost island of the Japanese archipelago, called Ezo before 
the Meiji era and Hokkaido after it, in this modernizing process has largely been ignored. 
The main islands of Japan, especially the largest, Honshu, were the political and 
economic centers of Japan where decisions were made. Japan’s capital and largest cities 
saw obvious tremendous changes as the nation opened to the West and industrialized, and 
have therefore attracted the a large majority of scholarly attention. Hokkaido, on the other 
hand, has rarely been seen as anything other than a semi-frontier land that was only 
slowly developed with significant foreign input and contributed very little to Japan 
overall. When this frontier was thrown open in the Meiji era, the Japanese also did not 
suddenly move to Hokkaido in mass, as was the case of the American West, and the 
population instead stayed concentrated within Japan’s three main islands. Ignoring the 
role of Hokkaido, scholars have largely traced the hard date of the beginning of Japanese 
colonialism only to 1895, with Japan’s incorporation of Formosa into its empire. Several 
of these positions require reinterpreting. 
 The few existing English-language works relating to Hokkaido are divided into 
several categories: those focusing on the native inhabitants of Hokkaido, the Ainu—their 
culture, and their eventual absorption into the Meiji state; books examining the role of 
Ezo/Hokkaido in Russo-Japanese relations; and, texts describing Hokkaido’s 
development, especially as it relates to the role of American advisors. Besides the 
contribution of numerous anthropologists in recreating what Ainu culture may have 
looked like, the two figures who have contributed most heavily to examinations of the 
acculturation of the Ainu are Brett Walker and David Howell. Walker’s The Conquest of 
Ainu Lands examines environmental aspects of the changing Ainu relationship with the 
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environment and their shifting patterns of subsistence in the Tokugawa era. Howell has 
several chapters of his Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan devoted to 
the intellectual transition of Ezo/Hokkaido and the Ainu from an outer land and a 
barbarian people to an inner land and a native people stripped of their identity. The works 
of Alexander Lensen (1971) and John Harrison (1953) are helpful, if dated, works that 
describe Russo-Japanese relations. Lensen’s text is more solidly a diplomatic history 
from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, where Japanese and Russian encounters in 
Hokkaido figure prominently. The focus of Harrison, on the other hand, is on the initial 
Meiji development of Hokkaido, with the goal of keeping it out of Russian hands. The 
final set of works examines the influence and roles of the Americans who were hired to 
assist with the development of Hokkaido under the Kaitakushi (the “colonial office,” in 
operation from 1871-82), mostly during the 1870s. Published by the Hokkaido 
government, Foreign Pioneers provides brief profiles of a wide range of foreign 
employees, while Fujita Fumiko’s American Pioneers and the Japanese Frontier deals 
with the roles and impressions of a select number of prominent Americans. A few other 
works written by Japanese authors on Hokkaido’s development also exist, though none 
have been published within the last 50 years, nor with any great depth. Ann Irish’s 2009 
book, Hokkaido: A History of Ethnic Transition and Development on Japan's Northern 
Island, attempts to put many of the above elements together, though her focus is 
primarily in political history and limited to the island itself. 
 A number of topics therefore open themselves for additional examination. The 
existing works on Hokkaido’s development era from the 1870s-1890s deal primarily with 
official policy, and fail to get down to the important details of what was planned, actually 
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attempted, and ultimately a success or failure. Taking a resource-based environmental 
and economic focus reveals a number of important aspects of development and sheds 
light on how these translated into official structures in Hokkaido and beyond. While 
many works on the Meiji era deal with the influence of foreigners upon Japan and the 
impact of modernization, few show this uneven trial-and-error process in action. Other 
works favor foreign influences over Japanese accomplishments. Finally, scholars have 
underestimated the role of Hokkaido in the colonization that came after 1895. Hokkaido 
is merely mentioned in passing in prominent works on the subject. For instance, 
Hokkaido is not referenced at all within W.G. Beasley’s Japanese Imperialism 1894-
1945. In a collection of essays entitled The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1954, editor 
Mark Peattie only acknowledges the importance of Hokkaido to Japanese colonialism in 
a partial paragraph, stating that “the Japanese effort in the development, exploration, and 
colonization of Hokkaido, 1873-1883…provided practical experience in the creation of a 
settlement colony.”1 He doesn’t, however, carry his analysis any farther than that or make 
any subsequent mentions of the island. 
Instead, the development of Hokkaido must be seen as a microcosm of larger 
issues faced by a modernizing Japan. The early stages of Meiji involvement in Hokkaido 
reveal how much the Japanese had to learn to catch up with the West, how the Meiji state 
educated those who would drive Japan forward, and, during the age of colonialism, how 
far the Japanese had come compared to the rest of Asia. Hokkaido’s development 
characterized the challenges Japan generally faced in learning from the West, in needing 
to develop its own economy and infrastructure, and in managing its own people, as well 
                                                 
1
 Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1954, 
ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 80-81. 
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as those not ethnically Japanese. The trial-and-error process of Japanese modernization is 
particularly evident in Hokkaido, though it has been less explored by scholars than events 
on the mainland. The early attempts at the development of Hokkaido and the 
management of the Ainu are revealing of the social and political structures that would 
later carry through in Japanese colonialism. Some of the same agrarian techniques or 
crops introduced by American advisors were later applied to the creation or development 
of colonial agriculture, infrastructure, and economies. Cultural biases evident in the 
Japanese management of Hokkaido’s native Ainu also played out in some similar ways 
within Japanese colonies. Analysis of Hokkaido therefore provides a fresh perspective as 
to how certain aspects of Japanese colonialization occurred as they did. The initial 
development during the 1870s-1890s also had a number of long-term consequences for 
the island itself, which have been largely unexplored by scholars. These include the 
overall growth of the island’s population and cities, crops introduced in the Meiji era that 
still flourish today, and the significant fact that the Japanese absorbed Hokkaido into 
Japan proper and ultimately retained it after World War Two, despite the loss of the rest 
of its empire. In short, an analysis of Hokkaido’s development from the 1870s-1890s in 
the context of both modernization and imperialism has been mostly lacking from the 
current historiography of Japan. A new look at Hokkaido’s long-term relevance provides 
important context to pre-War colonial activities and insights into how the Hokkaido of 
today achieved its present character. 
 The story of these events must begin in the Tokugawa era with an examination of 
early Japanese influences in Ezo and the clashes between Japanese and Russian explorers 
there, and in the islands to the north. Early Japanese settlements began the acculturation 
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of the Ainu, as well as some early environmental change. The onset of the Meiji era then 
threw aside many of the structural and intellectual values of Tokugawa era Japanese in an 
attempt to catch up with the West and avoid the colonial fate of most of East and 
Southeast Asia. This was avoided in part by hiring the Westerners themselves, who 
helped legitimize Japan’s claim to Hokkaido and began to plan out how it might be 
developed. Hokkaido was a potential treasure trove of natural and mineral resources, 
though figuring out how to begin to extract these items was a major difficulty for the 
Kaitakushi. The climate of Hokkaido was initially too cold to support rice-based 
agriculture. With rice being the primary food source for the rest of Japan, the Kaitakushi 
made a number of strategic plans for attracting immigrants, though it had little success 
until later years. The problem of food was solved in part by the importation of Western 
crops and animals by the American advisors and the creation of Sapporo Agricultural 
College (SAC), which was able to grow, test, and distribute crops to immigrants. The 
Kaitakushi and other Hokkaido administrations focused on building an infrastructure, 
from roads to some of the first railways and telegraphs in Japan, while developing 
schools and social services. Much of this work was supervised by Western advisors, 
though the Japanese who worked alongside them learned valuable skills from the 
experience, in addition to the training available at SAC. The Ainu were one of the first 
non-Japanese people the Meiji state attempted to administer, and its treatment of the 
island’s natives made it clear that Japanese progress was the primary motivating factor in 
the relationship. Japanese exploitation, with Ainu aid, of many fish and animals caused 
dramatic downswings in animal populations, making the hunting-oriented Ainu even 
more reliant on the Japanese state. Finally, Japanese colonialism would officially begin in 
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1895, while the influence of Hokkaido in colonial development would extend well 
beyond that date. The result of what was learned in Hokkaido is particularly evident in 
the administration of Formosa, Sakhalin, and Korea. Japan retained Hokkaido following 
its defeat in World War Two and the loss of all its colonies, confirming Hokkaido’s 
transition from an outer to an inner land. An examination of postwar Hokkaido reveals 
that the influence of the Kaitakushi and the American advisors is still evident in 
Hokkaido’s agriculture and economy. 
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CHAPTER 1 – PRE-MODERN HOKKAIDO AND THE MEIJI OUTLOOK 
 
Japanese contact with Hokkaido (called Ezo until the end of the Tokugawa era) 
and its inhabitants before the Meiji era is an extensive but important history to recount. In 
some ways, hundreds of years of Japanese influence over the Ainu constituted a slow 
economic conquest, which made the Ainu easy to fold into the Japanese empire post-
Meiji. Through trade, the Japanese slowly exploited the resources of Ezo and began to 
change its ecology and Ainu subsistence patterns. This trade garnered the interest of the 
Russians to the north, who began to seek out trade with the Japanese. Both the Japanese 
and Russians explored the islands in between Ezo and Russia, the island of Sakhalin and 
the Kuril Island chain, trading and building outposts in each area. Russian aggression in 
the north set the Japanese against the Russians up until, and beyond, the end of Japan’s 
Tokugawa era of isolation. This began a political and diplomatic scramble for Sakhalin 
and the Kurils, forcing the Japanese to move to secure their interests in Ezo. The Meiji 
Restoration would shift Japan’s gaze outward, as a new Japanese government worked to 
modernize Japan, learn from the West, and avoid the colonial fate of the rest of Asia. 
Hokkaido would come to play an important role in these efforts. 
Background on Japan and Ezo before 1650 
Sustained contact with Ezo and its inhabitants is thought to have reached 
significant levels sometime in the late Kamakura period (1185-1333) and further grew 
during the Muromachi era (1333-1573). Archaeological evidence suggests contact even 
before this point, although the Fujiwara clan of northeast Japan only began to trade 
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heavily with early Ainu peoples and influence their culture by the twelfth century.2 While 
trade with Ezo might not have been essential to the Fujiwara, economically speaking, the 
Ainu of Ezo might have abandoned some of their early cultivation practices to more 
heavily hunt and fish, thereby beginning changes in the ecology of Ezo even before the 
Tokugawa period. The Ainu harvested and traded in salmon, animal pelts, eagle feathers, 
and kelp. The Japanese established several forts and trading posts in southern Ezo during 
the Muromachi period. Early contact was generally peaceful, though there was at least 
one mid-fifteenth century war between the Japanese and the Ainu, in addition to a 
number of raids in the early sixteenth century, indicating that there was some early Ainu 
resentment against Japanese intrusion into their homeland.3 
 Ezo and the Ainu also began to appear in Western writing by the mid-sixteenth 
century. Perhaps the first description of the Ainu by a Westerner in 1548-49 is by the 
Italian Jesuit, Nicolo Lancillotto, who described the long beards, large stature, and 
martial prowess of the Ainu, noting that they fight like “Germans.”4 In 1565, Luis Fróis 
S.J., relaying hearsay, noted of Ezo that it was “a great country of savage men, clothed in 
beast skins, rough bodies with huge beards, and monstrous moustaches, the which [sic] 
they hold up with forks as they drink.”5 In 1600, another Western priest depicted the 
Ainu as “a most barbarous kind of people” who “live by hunting and fishing, and neglect 
                                                 
2
 Mark J. Hudson, "Ainu Ethnogenesis and the Northern Fujiwara," Arctic Anthropology 36, no. 1 (1999): 
77. 
3
 Brett L. Walker, "Reappraising the Sakoku Paradigm: The Ezo Trade and the Extension of Tokugawa 
Political Space Into Hokkaido," Journal of Asian History 30, no. 2 (1996): 175-77. 
4
 Donald F. Lach, Japan in the Eyes of Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 723. 
5
 Michael Cooper, They Came to Japan: An Anthology of European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640 (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1965), 294. 
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husbandry.”6 Finally, Jesuit Jeromino de Angelis suggested that they “know but little 
about the future life.”7 Barbarity and savagery, in addition to physical descriptions of the 
Ainu’s size and hairiness (in comparison to the Japanese), viscerally set the Ainu apart as 
an “other,” a primal to be feared in battle, but won over in other ways, including through 
trade.  
 Trade with the Ainu of Ezo was not strictly regulated until the time of the second 
of Japan’s three great unifiers, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98), and only formally 
established by Tokugawa Ieyasu, the leading member of the Tokugawa shogunate (1600-
1868) who ruled over a unified Japan. In the 1630s, Japan was largely closed off to 
foreign entry and trade with the implementation of the so-called sakoku (closed country) 
edicts. This isolation was due to a combination of fears of foreign (primarily Western) 
religions, trade, and military ambitions, in addition to the economic and political 
advantages this situation conferred on the central Tokugawa bakufu (literally, “tent 
government”), which had the sole official say on all foreign relations.8 The only 
foreigners formally allowed in Japan included Chinese traders at Nagasaki and trade with 
the Dutch on Nagasaki’s artificial island of Dejima, a walled compound they were not 
allowed to leave without Japanese permission. The Dutch served as one of Japan’s 
windows to the world and allowed for the import of Western books studied by rangaku 
(Dutch studies) scholars. For the rest of the Japanese domains (han) on the main islands 
                                                 
6
 Lach, Japan in the Eyes of Europe, 725. 
7
 Jeronimo de Angelis S.J., "The Ainu," in They Came to Japan: An Anthology of European Reports on 
Japan, 1543-1640 290. 
8
 See Toby for more information on the role of foreign relations and trade in establishing and maintaining 
the legitimacy of the Tokugawa bakufu. Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: 
Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1984). 
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of Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku, trade with outsiders was theoretically forbidden. There 
were, however, three main exceptions to this rule. 
 The first two were the han of Satsuma and Tsushima, which were given special 
“black seal” directives that granted them special extraterritorial privileges. Satsuma 
traded indirectly with mainland Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) China after the 
1609 invasion of the Ryukyu Islands. Satsuma manipulated a puppet state in Ryukyu into 
sending official trading and diplomatic missions into China, and reaped the rewards of 
these ventures, particularly in the form of silk and other goods. Satsuma would later 
become one of the most powerful han that led the way into the Meiji Restoration. 
Tsushima, on the other hand, was a poor island province that relied on trade with Korea 
for much of its livelihood. During the Tokugawa period, between 500 to 1,000 Japanese 
lived in the walled-off Waegwan (an isolated center of foreign trade similar to Dejima) 
and traded with the Koreans for foodstuffs.9 
The final exception to the sakoku rules, of course, was the trade that proliferated 
between the Japanese and Ainu in Ezo. Another house that was given special 
dispensations by the bakufu was Matsumae house, which exercised power in southern 
Ezo and whose rulers served as an intermediary between mainland Japan and the Ainu 
peoples of Ezo, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Island chain.10 Given the same “black seal 
directive” that the heads of the Satsuma and Tsushima domains were granted, Tokugawa 
Ieyasu presented the head of the Matsumae clan (formerly the Kakizaki, enfeoffed with 
                                                 
9
 See Robert K. Sakai, "The Satsuma-Ryukyu Trade and the Tokugawa Seclusion Policy," The Journal of 
Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (May 1964) and James Bryant Lewis, Frontier Contact Between Choson Korea and 
Tokugawa Japan (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2003) for additional information on trade through Ryukyu 
and the Waegwan in Korea. 
10
 “Mainland” is here referring to the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku. 
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their trading rights by Toyotomi Hideyoshi) with a decree that stated: “It shall be 
unlawful for people from outside provinces to enter or exit Matsumae to trade with the 
Ainu without the consent of Matsumae Shima-no-kami.”11 The Matsumae oriented 
themselves as keepers of the northern frontier land and their legitimacy was predicated on 
their role as the Japanese liaison between the mainland and the Ainu. Unlike the han of 
Satsuma and Tsushima, Matsumae was largely left to its own devices, perhaps due to the 
fact that it wasn’t China, Korea, or the West that Matsumae officials were dealing with. 
These were all military, economic, and diplomatic threats, as opposed to the various non-
centralized Ainu tribes. Only when there were major Ainu uprisings, threats from the 
West, or strong evidence of illicit trade, did the Tokugawa bakufu interfere in the affairs 
of the Matsumae in Ezo. 
The Slow Conquest of the Ainu: Trade, Mining, and Environmental Change 
Throughout the course of the Tokugawa period, the Ainu of Ezo and the other 
northern islands slowly lost a largely bloodless battle against the Japanese. Owing to 
Japanese trade with the Ainu, the latter’s relationship with the land changed, as Ainu 
subsistence patterns shifted to meet the trade demands of the Matsumae, in addition to 
ceremonial exchanges. Brett Walker, in The Conquest of Ainu Lands, argues that “two 
centuries of trade with Matsumae domain…had unraveled the social fabric of Ainu 
communities and undermined their ability, not to mention their basic will, to resist 
Japanese claims to what was once their homeland.”12 The Tokugawa period saw an 
                                                 
11
 Brett L. Walker, The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 37. Additionally, it was unlawful to inflict any harm on 
the Ainu, who could go where they pleased, while the Japanese could not travel in any of the northern 
islands without Matsumae permission. 
12
 Brett L. Walker, The Conquest of Ainu, 233. 
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increased number of Japanese move or work in southern Ezo, while explorers traded all 
across the island, and even farther north with Ainu tribes in Sakhalin and the Kuril Island 
chain. Japanese access to goods such as precious metals (gold) and animal pelts were 
limited in the mainland, while northern fishing grounds were plentiful. Japanese miners 
would extract the former, while the Ainu would begin to take animals and fish in excess 
of their usual practices, for use in trade. These systems would shape Ainu subsistence 
patterns as well as transform their land. 
The Matsumae clan’s legitimacy and partial economic livelihood was so 
intertwined with its Ainu oversight and trade that this led han officials to carefully shape 
their influence over the natives, both economically and socially. They required that the 
Ainu appear like the barbarians described above, when in the presence of outside 
observers. David Howell, in his book on the development of a Japanese identity based on 
the outside “other,” notes the example of an Ainu man who normally dressed and 
groomed himself in a Japanese fashion and lived in a Japanese village, but when it came 
time to represent his people, “He let his hair and beard grow long so that he might look 
properly Ainu when he went to pay his respects to the lord of the Matsumae domain.”13 
The Ainu were also often forbidden to speak Japanese in front of outsiders, at risk of 
being required to pay an indemnity. Mogami Tokunai, a later explorer and geographer of 
the north, noted in the eighteenth century that “In all matters the policy of not allowing 
the Ezo [Ainu] to adopt Japanese customs is the law of the Matsumae house.”14 The Ainu 
                                                 
13
 David L. Howell, Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), 119. 
14
 David L. Howell, "Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of the Early Modern Japanese State." Past & 
Present 142 (Feb. 1994): 85-86. 
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of Ezo were thereby constructed to appear as a people with whom only the Matsumae (as 
‘barbarian specialists’) could interact. 
 This Japanese influence also extended to alter the once traditional ways in which 
the Ainu survived and the manner in which they gathered foodstuffs. Over a course of 
decades, the Ainu with whom the Japanese most frequently traded began to increasingly 
rely on Japanese-imported rice for sustenance. The Matsumae strictly forbade their 
merchants from trading rice seed with the Ainu, for fear that they might become self-
sufficient in growing the most important Japanese export and undercut the Matsumae 
trade income.15 After appearing to have abandoned most agricultural practices in an 
earlier age, the Ainu came to rely on hunting and fishing to fulfill the need for clothing, 
foodstuffs, and other items. As trade volume with the Japanese increased, so too did the 
Ainu’s impact on local fish and game populations, which began to dwindle from their 
original levels. 
Pelts were valued in Japan as raw materials for leather working. Since the Nara 
period (710-794), Japan had ancient prescriptions against the slaughter of draft animals 
for their meat or hides in place. This was due in part to the influence of Buddhist 
prescriptions against hunting and meat-eating. It was also in part because Japan had little 
in the way of flat grazing ground and animals were better utilized as beasts of burden 
than food sources.16 These laws, however, did not keep the Japanese from importing 
animal hides that the non-Japanese Ainu gathered. The leather workers (considered a 
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defiling occupation) themselves were formed from the ranks of the eta outcastes who 
were also outside the normal Tokugawa class-status order. Feathers (including eagle 
feathers) were also valued as luxury items for the wealthy in large cities. 
Ezo was also noted for its precious metals, which were valuable in Japanese 
coinage and select foreign trade. In 1620, Jesuit Diego Carvalho described a process by 
which Japanese settlers within Matsumae-held territory would speculate and purchase 
parcels of river land, endeavor to divert the course of entire rivers, and then mined and 
sifted through “the sand which remained” until they discovered any gold that had settled 
into the former river bottom.17 One of the biggest fears of the trade in Nagasaki and 
Dejima, along with the relative trade autonomy of han like Tsushima and Satsuma 
(trading with Korea and China, respectively), was the outflow of Japan’s limited amount 
of precious metals, on which the Japanese coinage system was based. This coincides with 
widespread Japanese fears that Japan was losing excessive volumes of precious metals, 
on which its own currency system was based. Though perhaps on the alarmist side, a 
high-level advisor to the shogunate, Arai Hakusei, concludes at the turn of the eighteenth 
century that “one-fourth of the gold and three-fourths of the silver [in all of Japan] have 
been lost.”18 The bakufu began debasing coinage throughout the first half of the 
eighteenth century as a direct result of foreign trade. Instead, Ezo and the northern islands 
were mined for the same materials about which bakufu advisors had such great concerns. 
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These trade demands drove the Ainu to overuse their natural fish and game 
resources, while Japanese mining in Ezo also had a negative effect on fish populations. 
Brett Walker argues that the Ainu began to commoditize their hunting practices, viewing 
the animals they took as items to be traded (the larger the number caught, the larger the 
return), not subsistence resources on which their lives depended and were intertwined. 
The Ainu also began to value Japanese crafts as prestigious status-giving goods garnered 
through trade or ritual gift-giving, further depopulating animal numbers.19 Matsumae 
Norihiro, writing to the bakufu as early as 1715, lamented of Ezo that “recently it is not 
like it was before…In all four directions natural resources have become exceedingly 
scarce.”20 The mining practices of the Japanese, liberally altering the course of entire 
rivers, also served to destroy valuable spawning grounds for fish such as herring, 
throwing their numbers into decline. In some cases, various Ainu tribes began to compete 
against one another for the dwindling resources, while rebelling against the Japanese 
twice.21  
Besides the Satsuma clan’s manipulation of Ryukyu’s inhabitants, the Matsumae 
experience in Ezo was also one of the first Japanese attempts to construct identities for a 
colonized or subjugated people. Though later Meiji era prescriptions would demand that 
the Ainu look more like the Japanese, not less, the creation of identities would prove to 
be a tool applied to the Japanese imperialism of the twentieth century. So too would the 
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Japanese regulate the knowledge or education of their foreign subjects and establish 
separate physical spheres that divided Japanese settlers from colonized peoples. 
Ezo and the Russian Threat 
Despite the ecological shifts of Ezo and the beginning of the destruction of the 
Ainu’s past way of life, Ezo and its inhabitants were still viewed as an ambiguous 
borderland, or even an undesirable backwater. This was in part due to the Matsumae’s 
efforts to craft the Ainu “other,” and the generally colder climate of Ezo, but also because 
the bakufu’s political interest in the island was initally limited. This would begin to 
change with the southward exploration of the Russians from the Kamchatka Peninsula, 
down through the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, and eventually to Ezo and the main 
Japanese islands themselves. These probings would eventually be seen as a clear danger 
to the Japanese, one that would cause officials to begin to rethink their distant 
relationship with the northern islands, a trend that would continue well into the Meiji era. 
 Tokugawa Ieyasu, the first shogun of the Tokugawa era, asked the famed William 
Adams whether Ezo appeared on any Western maps, to which Adams replied, “I told him 
I never did see it put into anny mappe nor gllobe.”22 Initial Russian interest in Ezo and 
Japan would only come as a result of the flourishing Matsumae-Ainu trade, which flowed 
into the northern islands. The exclusive permission given by the bakufu for the Matsumae 
to trade with the Ainu had been liberally interpreted as permission to trade with the Ainu 
wherever they lived, and hence a justification for trade expansion into the territory that 
comprises modern-day Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.  
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Before the seventeenth century, the Russians had heard of a land that possessed 
great mineral wealth, while in later years traders and sailors in Siberia had come across 
Japanese goods. These had also been making their way northward, passing through the 
hands of various Ainu tribes who had traded with Japan in the south. Some of the 
Russians’ meager sources of information on the Japanese came from shipwrecked 
castaways, the first of which made their way to Russia as early as 1695, after being 
driven to Siberia following a typhoon. In the 1730s, the Russians would seriously attempt 
to make contact, setting up Japanese lessons for potential explorers with Japanese 
castaways, who patriotically praised the wealth of their home country. By 1739, one of 
the first expeditions to seek out Japan, the Spanberg mission, actually made ground in 
Awa province in northern Honshu.23  
 The Russian interest and later aggression prompted a re-imagination of Japan’s 
relationship with Ezo and the other northern islands. Japanese explorers such as Mogami 
Tokunai had encountered Russians in the Kuril Islands in 1785, and at that time 
exchanged friendly greetings with them. Other Japanese were sent to explore the island of 
Sakhalin, demonstrating a clear Japanese interest in the islands to the north of Ezo, and 
an awareness that the Russians also were taking their own interest in exploring, trading, 
and perhaps inhabiting some of the islands between Russia and Japan.24 Some Japanese 
thinkers advocated against what they saw as a growing Russian threat. Though little 
known at the time, Honda Toshiaki, a mathematician and scholar who funded some of the 
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travels of Tokunai, called for Japan to begin to abandon its sakoku policies and set up its 
own colonies. He wrote in 1789 that: 
At this crucial time when the Ezo islands are being seized by Russia, we are faced 
with an emergency within an emergency. When, as now, Japan does not have any 
system for colonizing her island possessions, there is no way of telling whether 
they will be seized by foreign countries or remain safe…The lack of a 
colonization system has kept Japanese rule from the island and has meant that the 
natives are unaware of the goodness of the ruler of Japan.25 
 
Ezo in this case refers to both the island that would become Hokkaido, as well as the 
islands to the north, though Honda worried that the Japanese hold over even the former 
was increasingly tenuous, with new competition on the scene. His fears were soon 
justified. 
In 1792, a mission led by Adam Laxman had landed in Ezo and successfully 
negotiated permission with the Matsumae and the bakufu to trade in Nagasaki, where the 
Dutch and Chinese made port. Not until 1805, however, would a Russian vessel actually 
make its way to Nagasaki, only for its captain to eventually be turned away after half a 
year of unsuccessful negotiations, when the Japanese reaffirmed their commitment to 
sakoku policies. The commander, Nicolai Rezanov, frustrated at the Japanese about-face 
and his failure to open trade, in 1807 ordered several of his subordinates to raid Japanese 
outposts in the islands north of Ezo in an act of revenge or as a misguided attempt to open 
Japan by force.26 This action would influence Russo-Japanese relations for a century 
before the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War and open up more active competition for the 
expansionary land that lay between Russia and Japan. The attack served to demonstrate 
the potentially fragile hold that the Japanese had over Hokkaido and the other northern 
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islands. It also awakened some Japanese to the idea they might not only have to fight to 
remain in control of outlying lands, but that they were also in competition with Western 
powers for the people who traditionally inhabited such spaces. 
From 1799-1821, the bakufu would take direct control over Ezo from the 
Matsumae (due to rumors of illegal Matsumae trade with Russia), something only 
previously done during the two Ainu rebellions. The first was from 1669-72, against the 
incursion of Japanese miners into Ainu lands, while the second occurred in 1789. 
Worried that the Ainu might turn toward the Russians, a new directive was issued a few 
years later in 1799, stating:  
We intend to promote education in the hope that the Ezo people will gradually be 
converted to Japanese customs and become so deeply attached to our ways that 
even if some foreign power seeks to win their favor…they will not waver in their 
allegiance… The best policy is to continue our efforts to raise their standard of 
living by means of trade.27 
 
Due to a combination of the 1789 rebellion, Japanese knowledge of Russian-Ainu trade, 
and controversy surrounding possible Matsumae trade with Russia (whether a 
justification for bakufu takeover or not), there was a clear reorientation of policy 
regarding the Ainu and Ezo. No longer were the Ainu a barbarian “other,” but a potential 
ally under benevolent Japanese control; nor was Ezo an inconsequential political 
backwater, but a buffer zone to protect the main Japanese islands from Russian expansion. 
Following the assault of Rezanov’s subordinates in 1807, Japan made a concerted 
effort to stake out its claims in Ezo and the islands beyond. Explorers such as Mamiya 
Rinzo went north to the island of Sakhalin in an 1808-09 effort to map the island, perhaps 
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with an eye for potential future Japanese expansion.28 During and after the bakufu’s 
1799-1821 takeover of Ezo, additional troops were temporarily stationed around the 
edges of Ezo, with the intent of defending the land. Samurai captured Russian captain 
Vasily Golovnin and held him prisoner for two years between 1811-13, before finally 
releasing him.29 Long-standing policies on the Ainu’s appearance and knowledge were 
sometimes altogether reversed, as many were encouraged to adopt the Japanese language 
and hairstyles. The Japanese also began to actively care for the health of the Ainu, with 
some regions after 1829 requiring them to report to medical posts if ill or showing signs 
of disease. This interest eventually resulted in an 1857 campaign to vaccinate Ainu and 
Japanese living in Ezo as part of what Brett Walker correctly calls an “assimilationist 
agenda,” one that would continue into the Meiji era.30 
Due to the events of 1807, Japanese sources continued to speak of the Russians 
with a particular suspicion, right up until Japan’s sakoku policies were forcibly ended in 
the 1850s. In 1825, an increasing number of foreign vessels, including English ones, 
appeared off of the Japanese shores. Aizawa Seishisai, a leader of the nationalistic Mito 
school wrote “The Russians are now hiding in wait for the kill” and were only having the 
English ships do their scouting for them.31 In 1842, when the English put increasing 
pressure upon the Japanese to open up trade with them, Sakuma Shozan, a samurai expert 
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on Western gunnery wrote, “If now we permit trade with England, the Russians will be 
angered at this betrayal…If the Russians see that Japan has given in to the English…they 
will conclude that the national strength of Japan has declined and they will make 
particularly unreasonable demands.”32 This sentiment is again reflected eleven years later 
in 1853, when Tokugawa Nariaki pondered that “Should permission be granted to the 
Americans, on what grounds would it be possible to refuse if Russia and the others 
[again] request it?”33 While trade with any additional foreign nations was undesirable 
during the Tokugawa period, Japanese thinkers seemed particularly keen on avoiding any 
intercourse with Russia in particular. This no doubt stemmed from fears of a repeat of the 
1807 event on a grander scale and general Russian competition in the north. 
Even though some political reorientation occurred with regards to the overall 
Japanese view of Ezo, Sakhalin, or the Kurils, the island was still not necessarily 
‘Japanese’ in the international diplomatic sense of the times. Japanese claims to these 
islands, taken in the context of the nineteenth century drive toward colonization, were 
still rather tenuous and were not officially recognized by the West. Indeed, from the 
Japanese perspective, even their three main islands were still under the threat of being 
colonized. Japan was forced to realign its goals from the traditional Confucian “civilized 
center, barbarian edge” to claims that were recognized in standard Western diplomatic 
practice and backed up with enough of an economic might and military threat to seem 
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viable.34 Though the Ainu of Ezo themselves had already in a sense been conquered by 
Japanese intrusion there for centuries, there were still fears that the Ainu might ally 
themselves with outsiders like the Russians against the Japanese. The Japanese had yet to 
begin addressing one of the most important parts of the equation, the formal occupation 
and development of the land itself, a marker of Japanese sovereignty that the West would 
be more likely to recognize. Efforts toward this end would come in rapid fashion after the 
end of the Tokugawa era and the establishment of the Meiji state, as Ezo was slowly 
transformed into an integral part of a modernizing Japan. 
Realignment of the Meiji Era 
 As has been noted, Russia attempted to open Japan for additional foreign trade as 
early as the eighteenth century. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Britain and the 
United States also made several unsuccessful attempts to do the same. It was not until 
1853 that American Commodore Matthew Perry, though an act of gunboat diplomacy, 
forced the Japanese to seriously consider opening their ports to Western powers beyond 
the Dutch. In 1854, Japan signed the Treaty of Kanagawa with Perry, when he returned to 
Japan with overwhelming force. After the British, the Russians also finally succeeded in 
signing a treaty with Japan in 1855. This was the beginning of the so-called “unequal 
treaties” under which Japan was forced to open up a number of ports at which foreign 
powers might trade and resupply their ships, in addition to the creation of foreign 
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consulates on Japanese soil.35 The bakumatsu period (1853-1867) followed, during which 
the Tokugawa shogunate quickly saw its 250 year power evaporate due to a lack of 
national confidence inspired by its inability to refuse foreign powers access to Japan. 
Taken from Aizawa Seishisai’s Shinron (New Theses), many factions adopted the slogan, 
sonnō jōi, or “revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians,” citing the bakufu’s failure in its 
traditional ceremonial role to protect the emperor. Although Emperor Kōmei also began 
to become increasingly involved in politics, it was his son, Mutsuhito, who would 
become the Meiji emperor and around whom a new government would be oriented 
following the fall of the Tokugawa house’s rule.36 
 The Meiji emperor and his supporters promulgated the five clause Charter Oath in 
April of 1868. This pseudo-constitution, which did away with past customs, opened 
participation in the government and all other careers up to the general populace, and 
called for knowledge to be sought throughout the world. There was a growing call for 
“men of ability” to lead, rather than the hereditary-type rule of the Tokugawa era. The 
emperor became the head of a system designed to support him, run by an oligarchic 
government made up of cliques from the most powerful former han. The oligarchs were 
from a group of domains that were victorious in the 1868-69 Boshin Civil War, a conflict 
that stamped out any remaining resistance from the bakufu.37 What followed was a period 
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of radical reorganization, as Japan’s leaders tried to reorient Japan’s focus from inward to 
outward and avoid the fate of Southeast Asia and China. There are currently eleven 
countries in Southeast Asia—ten out of eleven of them were colonies during the Meiji 
period, while China was defeated in foreign wars, experienced a horrible civil war, and 
was partially divided among Western powers.38 
 The underlying goals of the Meiji officials therefore were to make Japan strong 
and avoid a colonial fate. Leaders sought to make Japan itself a power in the East, to 
revise the “unequal treaties,” and to eventually be accepted by the West as an equal. 
Keeping in line with the 1868 Charter Oath, the Japanese sent emissaries around the 
world to learn about the organization of foreign governments, militaries, economies, and 
societies. The most well-known of these was the Iwakura mission of 1871-73. In a letter 
from the Meiji emperor to U.S. President Grant, it was straightforwardly stated that “It is 
our purpose to select from the various institutions prevailing among enlightened nations 
such as are best suited to our present conditions, and adapt them in gradual reforms and 
improvements of our policy and customs so as to be upon an equality with them.”39 
Fukuzawa Yukichi, who was initially a well-known advocate for learning from the ways 
of the West, stated in 1874 that “Now, suddenly, intercourse with foreign nations 
becomes a reality, and the business of our nation becomes closely tied with foreign 
affairs. The trend today is to compare things in our country with those of foreign 
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countries before taking any action.”40 What was once unquestioned during the Tokugawa 
era was now reexamined in the context of the West, and what the West would do. The 
Japanese government invited as many as 2,400 well-paid foreign advisors to help 
modernize Japan. These Westerners were instrumental in transforming Japan’s economy 
and military, updating its scientific and technical knowledge, performing geological 
surveys, and assisting in setting up factories and a modern infrastructure.41 Unlike China, 
Japan chose to learn from the West in order to throw off its yoke, no matter how slow or 
painful the process. Though it would take several decades, Japan eventually grew into an 
industrializing country, hungry for the land and resources required to do so. The defining 
slogan of the age became fukoku kyōhei, “rich nation, strong army.” 
Some concerns, however, would take more than a new era and new outlook to 
change, as competition and interference from Russia in Japanese affairs was still a 
concern. In advocating the need for a new universal conscription system that would draw 
from all ranks of Japanese society, not just former samurai, Vice Minister of Military 
Affairs Yamagata Artitomo cited the Russians and Hokkaido in 1872, stating that lately 
“Russia has been acting very arrogantly…it is inevitable that she will move eastward 
sooner or later by sending troops to Hokkaido.”42 A year later, Finance and Home 
Minister Okubo Toshimichi argued that “In regard to the diplomatic situation, the most 
important countries for us are Russia and Britain.” He worried that “Russia will interfere 
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unless we secure our independence” from the “unequal treaties,” or else foreign powers 
such as Russia (or others) might send troops into Japan under the pretext of maintaining 
the tenets of the treaties.43  
The northern islands were also a subject of the first treaty Japan signed with 
Russia in 1855. This was when Japan had a poor negotiating position after having just 
been forced open by the Americans. The Treaty of Shimoda clearly outlined where 
Japanese and Russian spheres of influence began and ended, despite the fact that claims 
of first exploration or trade with the Ainu were historically ambiguous. The treaty stated 
that “The whole island of Etorofu belongs to Japan and the whole island of Uruppu and 
the other Kuril Islands to the north constitute possessions of Russia. As regards the island 
Karafuto (Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan, as has been the 
case up to this time.”44 Etorofu (now Iturup) is just to the north of Kunashiri, an island 
visible off of the northern coast of Hokkaido. Ownership of Sakhalin was a debated topic 
both before the Russo-Japanese War, and after it, as Japan and Russia played games of 
international chess with the islands between them in an effort to create buffer zones away 
from one another’s main areas of control. The beginnings of modernization under 
consideration in central Japan therefore had to be extended northward, not only to give 
Japan a chance at extending its borders and playing the empire-building game with the 
West, but also in solidifying its hold over Hokkaido once and for all. 
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Conclusion 
Ezo would play an important role in realizing many of the goals of the Meiji era, 
in addition to warding off the advances of Russia. An 1877 memorial to the emperor had 
complained that: 
For a long time past, Japan has neglected to give proper protection to the northern 
portion of her dominion. In the time of the bakufu, even the children knew that 
Saghalien [sic] and the Kuriles [sic] belonged to Japan. But the Russians have 
come down below the fiftieth degree to hunt and have commenced to devour our 
country.45  
 
Given how little most Japanese had known about Hokkaido prior to the Meiji era, it 
certainly wasn’t true that “even children knew” that the northern islands had belonged to 
Japan. Meiji era thinkers, on the other hand, were certainly willing to envision this as 
having been the case. Japan had no intention of letting go of its grasp of Ezo, however. In 
1869, the island was officially renamed “Hokkaido” and declared open for Japanese 
settlement. 46 The Hokkaido Kaitakushi was set up to help interested Japanese immigrate 
to the new land and provide a temporary form of government there.47 This also began a 
long process that eventually divested many Hokkaido Ainu of their native lands. Heavy 
funding for development would be pumped through the Kaitakushi until its dissolution in 
1882. Sapporo Agricultural College (SAC), later one of the nine imperial colleges of 
Japan, was also established in 1876 under the presidency of American William S. Clark. 
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 At the outset, Hokkaido was spoken of as having great potential, especially for a 
modernizing nation such as Japan. Early surveys made by foreign advisors, including a 
team led by Horace Capron, former U.S. Commissioner of Agriculture, revealed a large 
amount of mineral wealth on the island, which also boasted plentiful fishing grounds and 
timber for the taking. Hokkaido, however, was initially an inhospitable place for rice-
based agriculture, which cut down on the number of willing immigrants, causing the 
Japanese and their American advisors to look for alternative subsistence and cash crops. 
These developments caused additional changes in the island’s ecology, while the Ainu 
were often casualties of the process. Hokkaido’s development would also settle once and 
for all any lingering issues over Japan’s legitimate hold over the island, as it was 
transformed into an essential piece of an empire in the making. This empire was formed 
in part with the aid of lessons learned from foreign advisors and through the 
modernization of Hokkaido and Japan in general. 
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CHAPTER 2 – HOKKAIDO’S UNTAPPED POTENTIAL AND EARLY 
 
CHALLENGES: ECOLOGY, CLIMATE, AND SURVEYS 
Immediately following the transition to the Meiji era, Ezo was renamed 
“Hokkaido” and systematically surveyed with the goal of modern development and to 
reveal both the island’s potential and the possible challenges that any progress would face. 
These early stages of development were several-fold. Holding back the encroachment of 
the Russians was often understood to be a primary motivating goal, and surveying and 
developing the island provided Japan with a legitimizing claim to it in the eyes of the 
West. Another factor was economic. Japan was a nation hoping to industrialize, and it 
needed all the resources it could cobble together to give it a chance to catch up with the 
West. Hokkaido could, and did, provide a potential diamond in the rough in terms of 
resources, which if developed and refined could provide Japan with an additional 
economic boon and greater self-sufficiency. Lacking knowledge in many areas 
surrounding modern development, the Meiji government had to hire foreign “men of 
ability,” upon whom it relied to unearth Hokkaido’s potential. Hokkaido also provided 
potential room for growth for the citizens of an expanding empire.  
The largest challenge to the development of Hokkaido, as surveyors and the 
government soon realized, was not Russia or the West generally, but rather the land itself 
and the colder climate. A land that was initially without the promise of potential rice 
cultivation did not provide an attractive immigration destination for many ordinary 
Japanese, whose agrarian origins and training did not necessarily match the environment 
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of Hokkaido. Surveyors and early explorers spoke about the potential of Hokkaido’s 
timber, fishing, and other natural industries. Important mineral reserves such as coal were 
scouted and the advisors offered some suggestions as to what might be viable and how 
each might be extracted. The Meiji government under the Kaitakushi attempted to search 
out and set in motion the creation of structures to exploit these resources. The Kaitakushi 
was successful in some instances, but was an expensive failure in other areas. The 
population of Hokkaido also grew, though the government still had trouble attracting 
immigrants from Japan’s main islands. 
Ezo/Hokkaido before the Kaitakushi 
 The early interaction between the Ainu and Japanese, as well as the exploration of 
Ezo by the latter, created the island’s embryonic economy. This produced a few small 
cities in the southern part of the Ezo and a ring of villages and outposts around the rest of 
the island, which were used for fishing, trade, and defense. In the coastal areas, the Ainu 
were often organized and employed in local industries, most commonly in fisheries, 
under the supervision of samurai and Japanese merchants. The Japanese government took 
direct control of the largest port city, Hakodate, in 1854, as it was to be opened to foreign 
trade after signing the Convention of Kanagawa with the United States.  The bakufu 
extended its control over all of Ezo by 1856, a year after Russia also signed an “unequal 
treaty” with Japan.48 The port was to supply foreign vessels with “wood, water, 
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provisions, and coal” and would gradually grow through foreign commerce.49 Hakodate 
also hosted Russian and English consulates. 
 The island of Ezo/Hokkaido is now listed as having an area of 83,456 km² 
(32,222 mi²), approximately as large as Ireland or Austria, and represents twenty-two 
percent of Japan’s overall land area.50 The vast majority of this land in 1860, however, 
was unmanaged, undiscovered, and unsettled by the Japanese. Christopher Hodgson, 
English ambassador in Hakodate from 1859-60, observed that “All around the coast there 
are innumerable fishing villages, but in the island I do not believe there is a city, town, or 
village of importance five miles from the coast.” Instead of the Japanese, the “Bear and 
deer [were] the land-lords and tenants” of Ezo’s inner lands.51 Only Matsumae and 
Hakodate stood as cities of any size, and the Japanese inhabitants of the island totaled 
less than 50,000 (primarily located in the south) of some 30 million Japanese on all four 
islands.52 
 Nonetheless, even in the very early stages of Japan’s opening to the West and 
beginnings of modernization, the potential of the island was viewed in high regard. Ezo 
provided the northernmost ports of Japan, and significantly, some were free of ice year-
round. One of the factors driving the Russian push southward was the desire to secure 
such ice-free ports for easy year-round trade, a goal of which the Japanese were well 
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aware as they also moved to secure their interests in Ezo and further north. Hodgson 
commented that ports like Hakodate held such geographical convenience and strategic 
potential that “Hakodate, in the hands of a European power, might become a Gibraltar or 
Aden.”53 He also correctly speculated that the “great sources of the wealth of Yezo, or 
rather what will eventually prove to be so…are the precious metals and the timber.”54 
Other explorers, such as Samuel Beal specifically noted that Ezo was “rich in minerals” 
including coal in the southern parts, while “gold is not unfrequently [sic] met with in the 
mountains.”55 In exploring the area around Hakodate, he found the soil to be a “rich black 
loam,” which would be “exceedingly productive” when cultivated properly.56 Early 
observers also commented on the sea’s bounty. Hodgson, when traveling from Hakodate 
to a nearby city, a distance of some twenty-two miles, observed large amounts of 
seaweed, and that along the coastline “every available inch is covered with it.”57 Fishing 
was similarly praised. Most of these products had been exported to the main islands of 
Japan since early Tokugawa times; however, the extraction possibilities for modern 
industries was potentially incalculable. The development of these industries would be at 
the forefront of the new Meiji government’s priorities once the Tokugawa house fell.  
Oddly enough, as the object of the beginning of Japan’s empire, Hokkaido was 
also host to the last vestiges of the Tokugawa regime during the Boshin War (1868-69). 
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Following defeats on the main islands, Admiral Enomoto Takeaki escaped to Hakodate in 
1869 with 2,000 pro-shogunate men in an attempt to set up a separatist country in Ezo.58 
These forces were defeated in only a few months by imperial forces in support of the 
Meiji emperor, led by Kuroda Kiyotaka, a military leader from Satsuma han, a domain 
that led the way into the Meiji era. This, if nothing else, thrust Ezo/Hokkaido back into 
the consciousness of Japan as a point of strategic interest. Both of these men would go on 
to prominent careers in the Meiji era and be particularly influential in Hokkaido’s 
development. Enomoto, whose life was spared when his captor Kuroda threatened ritual 
suicide if Enomoto was not left alive, would become an envoy to Russia and temporarily 
part of the Kaitakushi before attaining several ministerial posts.59 Kuroda, on the other 
hand, would become head of the Kaitakushi itself, and eventually the second Prime 
Minister of Japan (1888-89). It was his vision, more than that of any other Meiji official, 
that would provide a foundation for the development of Hokkaido to come. 
The Formation of the Kaitakushi and Employing Foreign Advisors 
 As Enomoto’s forces were under siege, the young Meiji emperor issued an 
official proclamation announcing his (and the government’s) intent to develop the island, 
while a framework to do so was created shortly thereafter. The emperor declared that 
“After Hakodate is quieted, We intend to take steps to reclaim and people the island.”60 
In July of 1869, only a month after the fall of the remaining shogunate forces, a new 
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colonial governing body was formed and a new inland capital, what would become the 
city of Sapporo, was selected. Ezo at this point was officially renamed Hokkaido, though 
the former name still persisted for a number of years after the change. An initial force of 
officials was instructed by a head of state to treat the Ainu natives fairly, increase 
economic activity, and work “harmoniously,” with the underlying “chief motive” again 
being to do these things in order “to check the expansion of Russian power southward.”61 
Kuroda, one of the few high-ranking officials to actually have spent time on the island, 
quickly became the obvious choice to become the head of the newly formed Kaitakushi 
in 1871. The Kaitakushi would administrate over Hokkaido, the southern (Japanese) 
portion of Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands closest to Japan, totaling eleven prefectures in 
all. The office would be the first Meiji governmental entity to oversee territories beyond 
the scope of Japan’s traditional control, or those that were only ambiguously occupied by 
the Japanese.  
 The Kaitakushi was granted a total of 10 million yen over a ten-year period from 
1872-82, in addition to its own income, to spend on development. Even with this 
enormous sum, however, the number of issues to be addressed was dizzying. Immigrants 
had to be encouraged to settle in Hokkaido, while also maintaining defense over the 
island. Basic infrastructure including roads and communication systems were largely 
nonexistent, while the development of specific settlements, including the new capital of 
Sapporo, had to be attended to. Other than fishing, Hokkaido’s basic industries were also 
undeveloped, while the land was heavily forested, mountainous, and unexplored. Kuroda 
was well aware of these challenges, and advocated for the installation of dedicated 
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officials, good treatment of the Ainu, and with regards to the land and economy, “that 
advisers well versed in the work of reclamation should be employed, and that some 
experts in mineralogy should be employed to inspect minerals, &c.”62 
 The government tried initially to solve the problem of immigration and defense by 
encouraging the immigration of samurai and their families to Hokkaido. There, they were 
to both populate the land and defend it. In particular, the samurai from the defeated clans 
who had supported the shogunate in the Boshin War were utilized for this purpose. Shiba 
Goro, a samurai from the defeated Aizu clan of northern Honshu, wrote that Aizu men 
were encouraged to settle in Hokkaido, “with the understanding that they would be set 
free and allowed to have their families in the detention centers…join them.”63 In 1869, 
the Aizu clan departed to Hokkaido with 200 families, and was organized into tondenhei, 
or military colonies, at strategic points around Hokkaido, along with other samurai from 
the north. The government, similar to the appointment of Kuroda, seemed to have been 
making a point of selecting individuals that had some association with Hokkaido, or were 
from the northern (and therefore colder and less fertile) parts of Japan, to serve various 
roles in the defense and development of Hokkaido because they would have realistic 
expectations about Hokkaido’s climate.64 In Japan’s later imperial expansion, soldiers, 
and often their families, were frequently both the first occupiers and long-term residents 
to foreign territories, particularly that of Formosa. 
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 Outside of the several thousand samurai families who emigrated from Japan’s 
main islands to Hokkaido, the Kaitakushi also set up incentives for Japanese of other 
backgrounds to do the same. Samurai could be used for defense, reclamation labor, and 
often worked in fisheries, though due to the Tokugawa separation of generations of 
samurai from the land, they often lacked in practical farming experience.65 Encouraging 
farmers, however, also initially proved difficult, as many were hesitant to leave their 
villages and kinship ties for immigration to a new and unproven land. In 1871, the 
Kaitakushi attempted to attract immigrants with heavy subsidies, providing families with 
several years worth of rice, paid passages to Hokkaido, farming equipment and tools, 
seeds, and a cash bonus for the amount of land cleared.66 This program proved to be very 
expensive to the Kaitakushi, however, and didn’t initially bring many immigrants to 
Hokkaido. The government also later attempted to build ready-to-work farms with 
cleared land and small buildings for sale. Although as William Wheeler, a later president 
of Sapporo Agricultural College, noted in 1877, “purchasers however [were] not 
abundant” for such plots. Most immigrants were ultimately drawn from the “poor 
classes,” which Wheeler stated “are almost ten-tenths of those who come here in a private 
capacity.”67 This initial lack of interest in Hokkaido’s opportunities, family ties aside, 
also had much to do with Hokkaido’s colder climate. 
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 Under contemporary definitions, the Hokkaido of today is listed as being located 
in a subarctic zone.68 Therefore, in addition to all of the other challenges faced in 
developing Hokkaido, perhaps the biggest was the cold weather. Rice and other crops 
initially did not meet with much success in Hokkaido, even in the more temperate regions 
such as Hakodate and Sapporo. In Nemuro, in the eastern part of Hokkaido, ship captain 
Henry St. John wrote in 1871 that the “cultivation of rice was attempted, but entirely 
failed.”69 The entire Tokugawa economy had been based on rice, while the lives of most 
peasants, who made up the vast majority of the population, were still centered around rice 
cultivation. William Wheeler described the “principle crops” of Japan as “rice (first, last, 
and always).”70 Trying to get Japanese peasants to take up a place in Hokkaido, initially 
utterly lacking in any attraction to agrarian rice-growers, proved difficult to say the least. 
St. John continued that by his observations, “Notwithstanding the inducements of a house, 
money, and free living being held out by the Japanese Government, these people cannot 
be got to migrate so far north, dreading the cold season.”71 These early agricultural 
failures were certainly recognized, as was the lack of knowledge and the ability of the 
government to transform Hokkaido’s infrastructure and industries from almost 
nonexistence, into modern, efficient ones. For aid, Kuroda and the Kaitakushi, much like 
the Meiji government in general, turned its attention to hiring foreigners where native 
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ability was lacking. In particular, Kuroda looked toward the upstart Americans to assist 
Japan. 
 The reasoning for choosing Americans in particular was several fold. America 
was not yet a colonial power in the sense that other Western nations were, but the 
Americans had settled a vast continent and had practical, contemporary experience in 
such matters.72 The technical knowledge of American engineers and scientists was 
rapidly increasing and America possessed advanced agricultural technology. The 
American government had in place working structures for settling and dividing land, 
bringing industry to it, and dealing with native peoples who had been dispossessed of 
their territories, upon which the Kaitakushi could model its own laws and programs. Nor 
did America have any conflicts, or strong alliances with Russia, which Japan still viewed 
as its main competitor for northern lands. There were also thriving American cities and 
territories at latitudes similar to Hokkaido, such as Chicago, New York, and the then-
territories of the U.S. Pacific Northwest. 
Development, especially under the advice of another Western nation, would 
provide a sense of legitimacy of Japanese ownership of the land. Sidney Bridgeford, 
writing in 1873, said of most of Ezo’s potential acreage that “At present they are 
uncultivated and are consequently valueless to mankind. Hundreds of thousands of acres 
[are] lying idle.”73 As environmental historian William Cronon has demonstrated, and 
Bridgeford reflects, the Western view of the land often requires that it must be subdued 
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and cultivated, otherwise the owner is somehow not living up to their claim upon the 
property, and therefore Western outsiders such as the Russians could legitimately lay 
claim to underutilized areas.74 In demonstrating their commitment to developing the land 
by hiring American advisors, however, the Japanese thereby solidified their claim to 
Hokkaido in the eyes of the West.  
With the permission of the Dajokan and encouraged by the United States minister 
in Japan, Kuroda negotiated with the American government regarding the appointment of 
a chief advisor for the Kaitakushi.75 Several candidates were offered in negotiations 
through U.S. Commissioner of Agriculture Horace Capron and President Grant. With the 
blessing of Grant, the position was ultimately offered to Capron himself in 1871, who 
accepted the offer with an extravagant $10,000 salary, and paid travel and living 
expenses.76 Capron was also honored by an audience with the emperor upon his arrival, 
one of several. Capron would remain in Japan until 1875. He brought with him A.G. 
Warfield, a civil engineer, and Thomas Antisell, a geologist and mineralogist. The 
Japanese government also hired Benjamin Lyman, a mining engineer and surveyor, 
among others. Capron’s son later hired rancher Edwin Dun in 1873. In all, the Kaitakushi 
hired eighty-eight foreign employees, fifty-six of whom were a diverse group of 
Americans with varying specialties.77 For their part, the Americans generally sought 
                                                 
74
 Which is what justified the taking of Native American lands in what would become the United States, for 
instance. The natives were not seen as properly utilizing the land upon which they lived. See William 
Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2003).  
75
 An imperial-appointed assembly roughly analogous to the Department of State. 
76
 Harrison, Japan's Northern Frontier, 68-70. 
77
 Jones, Live Machines, 145: The remainder were from a smattering of European countries, with 13 being 
Chinese who primarily worked in the fishing industries of Hokkaido. 
  
41 
 
employment abroad for the good wages offered by the Japanese government, especially 
during the beginning years of the Panic of 1873, part of an international economic 
depression.78 
Besides the legitimization that hiring American and other foreign advisors offered, 
there was a pressing need to know exactly what Hokkaido could provide to Japan, 
especially in terms of mineral wealth, even given perceived Japanese risks in hiring 
outsiders to do so. Hodgson had commented that “all the Japanese assure you that the 
north of Niphon is one large continuous bed of gold and silver,” though what little 
exploration or mining that had been conducted during the Tokugawa era did not reveal 
anything close to the whole extent of Hokkaido’s mineral or natural resources. Nor did 
these early explorations add to the ability of the Japanese to develop these resources into 
modern, profitable industries.79 As has been demonstrated, the main interest of foreigners, 
Westerners and Easterners, in Japan during the early Tokugawa period was Japan’s 
mineral resources, particularly copper and silver. St. John noted, likely due to Japanese 
fears of the West learning what kind of resources Japan had and exploiting them from the 
Japanese, that “Up to the present day, all knowledge that the Japanese possesses [sic] 
regarding the mineral wealth of the country is kept entirely to themselves.”80  
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Hokkaido therefore represented a part of the larger openness of Japan to the West, 
in that Westerners were not only learning about Japan’s strategic resources, but were 
actually hired to discover them for the Japanese. This was something of a calculated 
gamble on the part of the Japanese, but Japan could not become a “first class nation” 
without resources or modern development. The undertaking of the Kaitakushi was a 
small part of a larger Meiji era attempt to first use Westerners to change Japan’s 
structural and intellectual outlook, then become students of the West so as to increase the 
overall pool of knowledge in Japan, and train individual Japanese in technical fields. 
Japan therefore might eventually stand on its own and become, with the West, equal 
players on the world’s stage. 
The Bounty of the Land and Foreign Advice 
 The foreign advisors, organized under Horace Capron, began in 1871 an 
ambitious set of surveys ranging across the island to discover what lay within the “perfect 
wilderness of impenetrable forest” that existed in Hokkaido’s interior.81 The foreign 
advisors and other explorers spoke highly of Hokkaido’s natural potential, including its 
extant fishing and aquatic industries, but also of the potential wealth in lumber and 
minerals such as coal. These surveys were critical to determining what, exactly, the 
investment in Hokkaido potentially would yield beyond only “build[ing] up a barrier 
against Russian encroachment,” but also in beginning to transform Hokkaido into an 
integral part of Japan as a whole.82 The surveys also provided a generally realistic 
                                                 
81
 St. John, Notes and Sketches from the Wild Coasts of Nipon, 5-6. 
82
 Thomas Wright Blakiston, Japan in Yezo: A Series of Papers Descriptive of Journeys Undertaken in the 
Island of Yezo, at Intervals Between 1862 and 1882 (Yokohama: Japan Gazette, 1883), 40. 
  
43 
 
estimation of how much work there was to be accomplished. Even if some resources did 
exist, actually developing them and determining along what lines to do so was easier said 
than done. This sometimes initially proved very costly, while some resources were not as 
bountiful as originally thought. The Americans and other outsiders were also quick to 
offer solutions that some Japanese were hesitant to adopt, especially with regard to 
agriculture. Either way, the experience was a learning one, an education not only about 
discovering Hokkaido’s resources, but also in picking up on Western structures and 
methods and employing them in part or whole. 
 Of all natural industries, the one that had been employing Japanese and Ainu for 
hundreds of years, and by the 1870s still employed the most, was the Japanese fishing 
industry. Besides those founded for defense, it was fishing that had sprinkled so many 
small villages around the coastal regions of Hokkaido and at the headwaters of major 
rivers. Many of Capron’s surveyors and other observers pointed out the massive 
quantities of fish they witnessed during their stay in Hokkaido. The salmon run up the 
major rivers, such as the Ishikari, for example, brought thousands of seasonal workers 
into Japan. St. John wrote in the 1870s that the fish were so plentiful during this time, 
“that their backs are visible, and that the water rises along the banks as the first rush takes 
place over the bar at high tide.”83 John Milne, a geologist hired by the Japanese 
government who lived there for twenty years, also later reported that he had seen “five 
killed by a single shot from a rifle,” and that when the season occurred, “The shores are 
strewn with dead and dying fish that have run themselves on shore and failed to get back 
                                                 
83
 St. John, Notes and Sketches from the Wild Coasts of Nipon, 17. 
  
44 
 
to their natural element.”84 Naturalist Thomas Blakiston who journeyed to Hokkaido 
during the Capron surveys estimated that the average catch of just the Ishikari River 
averaged about 1.2 million fish (3,000 tons worth). The fish were dried and salted and 
exported “to Tokio and the east coast of Japan, as well as to Hakodate for the west coast 
ports.”85 Fishing easily proved to be one of the largest early revenue sources for the 
Kaitakushi, providing some $350,000 in 1874 in taxes on caught fish and government 
lease of fishing grounds, increasing the Kaitakushi’s annual budget by about a quarter, on 
average. Capron advocated the recent technique of canning fish, rather than drying and 
salting them, to appeal to a larger market. He also called for the government not to tax the 
fishermen as heavily, as he feared this stifled growth in the industry. He claimed that 
“there is no room for a doubt that these fisheries may easily be extended many millions of 
dollars annually.”86  
Some fish were also not just useful as consumable foodstuffs, but as a fertilizer. 
Explorer Arnold Landor later observed of sardines that, when looking out from the coast, 
“The sea is so dense with them that it changes its colour, and these moving banks of 
sardines are distinguishable 4 or 5 miles from the coast.”87 Sardines were particularly 
important in Japan during Tokugawa and Meiji times as a ground bio-fertilizer for rice 
paddies prior to the widespread use of chemical fertilizers. Japan was still a primarily 
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agrarian society until after the Meiji era. Fertilizer in particular was therefore critical to 
Japan, especially given its large population, which about doubled during the Meiji era, 
and limited land area where ground couldn’t be allowed to rest fallow. Fish and seaweed 
in general made up a common foodstuff consumed by Japanese from all levels of society, 
while the use of fish fertilizer provided an important boost to rice-based agriculture. 
 Another obvious industry lay in the “impenetrable forest” of the island. A. G. 
Warfield, acting as Engineer in Chief to the Kaitakushi, wrote of Hokkaido in 1871 that 
there was an “abundant growth of various kinds of trees, nearly all of which are suitable 
for building purposes.”88 R.G. Watson, a former ambassador in Japan, noted a few years 
later that Capron estimated that the “average acre of Yezo forest may contain about 
42,500 feet of planking,” in an area now made up about a quarter of Japan’s land mass. 
Much wood for construction at that time, however, which otherwise “might be procured 
in Yezo, is likewise being constantly brought from the United States [and] Hong-kong.”89 
If Japan developed the logging industry in Hokkaido, that would further compliment the 
goal of obtaining modern, self-sufficient industries and decrease Japan’s reliance upon 
foreigners and foreign goods—and thereby foreign influences.  
 These were some of the obvious resources, apparent even to the casual observer. 
Geologists such as Benjamin Lyman, who made the single largest contribution to 
Hokkaido in the area, however, were required to determine the state of mineral resources 
in Hokkaido. Lyman noted that while Hokkaido had been known for mineral wealth, 
including gold, in earlier ages, most of the well-known mines only actually possessed 
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small lodes, commenting that their “widespread fame in spite of their smallness” 
demonstrated how thoroughly some parts of “the country [have] been searched.”90 In his 
official reports, he complained that the Japanese officials who were also touring the 
country and conducting concurrent surveys only visited “mineral places that were known 
for a long time to the Japanese…and have discovered scarcely a single new place.”91 
Lyman, along with Capron, argued that Hokkaido must be surveyed using modern 
techniques to determine whether or not particular lodes were actually worth investing in, 
especially if they were so small that they would quickly peter out, and not ultimately turn 
a profit. This was a major reason behind the employment of foreign advisors, to help 
create generally realistic expectations of the costs of modernization overall, and for the 
development of Hokkaido specifically.  
 Coal was the mineral resource for which Hokkaido ultimately was to be known, 
not gold. While Lyman did discover some gold, along with deposits of sulfur, limestone, 
and iron sand, he concluded at that time that “In respect of economical Geology, coal 
continues to be almost the only workable mineral yet known in Yesso.”92 While other 
resources were later discovered and successfully exploited, Lyman discovered and 
surveyed several massive coal deposits in the Ishikari plains near Sapporo, and in 
Yubetsu and Tokachi, to the south and southeast, respectively. He estimated there to be 
65 million tons of more easily exploitable coal, and even additional deposits at lower 
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depths.93 This was an amount that Capron thought “should be able to supply the coal 
markets of the east if properly developed and worked.”94 Coal, of course, was particularly 
essential to industrialization in its use in powering steam engines that drove rail and water 
transportation, as well as in making iron. Warfield noted rightly that coal was the “basis 
of most of the wealth of Great Britain, and…has enabled the United States to take her 
present stand among the nations of the earth.”95 This was then a most fortuitous resource 
to discover in Hokkaido at the time, and most early investment in mineral extraction was 
thrown into coal, rather than gold. Lyman was satisfied with his surveys because if 
existing “schemes for washing gold in Yesso” had been allowed to proceed uninformed, 
this “would undoubtedly have proved disastrous.”96 As expensive as it might have been 
to employ foreigners, men like Lyman saved the Japanese from much misadventure and 
helped shift expectations of Hokkaido to ones backed up more by science and less by 
unproven historic reputation. It was useful for Japanese policy makers to begin basing 
strategies to exploit resources on science, rather than rumor, tradition, or popular 
knowledge alone. The path of modernization was not a straight one, but required learning 
and trial along the way. 
 The future potential of natural resources aside, the Kaitakushi and the American 
advisors also faced the challenges of figuring out general plans for the development of 
Hokkaido’s roads and cities. The selection of the site at Sapporo for the capital of 
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Hokkaido, for instance, was brilliant in the long term but initially troubling and expensive 
during the Kaitakushi era because of the effort, money, and engineering solutions 
required to connect the capital to Japan’s economy. Sapporo is about twenty miles inland 
from the Sea of Japan to the north. The city is situated in the western portion of the 
Ishikari Plain, and was specifically chosen because it was one of the warmest and most 
fertile lowlands of an otherwise mountainous island. Its distance inland made it 
potentially more suitable for defense than Hakodate, though the trek there, when 
transporting foodstuffs or outside construction materials, was initially long and arduous.97 
Warfield argued that Sapporo could only reach its full potential if connected to nearby 
ports through “first class roads.” He and many of the American advisors were of the 
opinion that “Roads have at all times been the most influential agencies of settlements 
and progress, roads are literally the pathways not only of industry, but of social and 
national intercourse.”98 While some simple roads did exist, most were neither well-made 
nor well-repaired, and often initially inhibited basic transportation and the flow of 
commerce. Bridges across the rivers around Sapporo were also often washed away, 
prompting Bridgeford to comment that the “Japanese have yet to learn how necessary it is 
to keep a road in repair.”99 The American advisors and later members of Sapporo 
Agricultural College kept the construction of roads high on their list of advice, in addition 
to the future construction of railroads between key areas. Japanese budgets did not always 
support the implementation of such recommendations, while road building in Hokkaido’s 
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environment was not always successful. In the later imperial realm, however, this advice 
was taken to heart, and colonies like Formosa and Sakhalin quickly had roads 
crisscrossing their respective territories.  
 Roads and cities were only useful, however, if there were citizens to use and 
populate them. Here the climate was again an issue. Between 1869-75, when Capron 
departed, the population of Hokkaido did increase overall from 58,476 to 183,630, 
though this was still a drop in the bucket compared to 30 million Japanese in all.100 
Thomas Antisell, in his observations in a report to Capron, had deemed that Hokkaido’s 
climate should be called sub-arctic. This was a view that didn’t support Capron’s, who 
was attempting to make Hokkaido a better sell to the Japanese. The report “was therefore 
suppressed.”101 In comparison to Tokyo, for instance, Sapporo had 148 nights of frost and 
35 frosty days, verses only 67 such nights in Japan’s capital.102 It was even colder further 
to the northeast. A sizable part of Hokkaido’s potential population only inhabited the 
island during the prime fishing seasons, thereafter returning to the mainland and taking 
their productive capabilities and contributions to the local economy with them. Watson 
spoke of “many thousands of fishermen, labourers, and others, who come to Yezo from 
other islands for the summer months” on a temporary basis and “later quit it for their 
homes on the approach of winter,” when there was there was no other work to be had or 
any agricultural preparation to be undertaken.103 
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 For the Americans, the solution to this problem was simple—shift the reliance 
away from rice toward crops that would actually grow in the colder climate of Hokkaido. 
While the government had been encouraging immigration with the availability of 
incentives listed above, this practice didn’t necessarily encourage innovation or self-
sustaining practices on the part of immigrants. In an early letter to Kuroda, Capron wrote: 
…to insure [sic] a healthy and vigorous development and settlement of the Island 
of Yesso it is first necessary to change the habits and food of its present and 
prospective population; that it was folly to attempt a forced settlement depending 
upon the rice of Nippon as their principal food; that to be successful this Island 
must be self sustaining and produce its own food.104 
 
Self-sustaining food that could be grown in Hokkaido at that time was not rice. The 
American advisors advocated the cultivation of underground tubers (potatoes, daikon) in 
the northern regions, which remained mostly unaffected by hard freezes, as well as the 
introduction of vegetable crops such as corn or onions, or fruit trees and wheat in the 
south. Capron also called for the raising of stock in Hokkaido. Unlike produce, which 
could spoil, animals could be accumulated and provide growing income. Capron argued 
that those who farmed had “no market for their surplus productions” because of a lack of 
population and easy transportation. In addition, there were generous government 
subsidies, which gave “no incentive to produce anything more than what will simply keep 
soul and body together.”105 He also advocated in the very first annual report to the 
Kaitakushi in 1871 that the government should consider setting up an agricultural college 
in order to test and develop crops that would thrive in Hokkaido. Furthermore, to ward 
off the cold, he recommended that the government should create a plan for providing 
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Western-style housing with thicker walls, raised floors, and fireplaces fueled by plentiful 
Hokkaido wood for settlers in Hokkaido. That way, Japanese “unused to the cold climate 
of Yesso, should be effectually protected from the rigors of winter.”106 Many of these 
suggestions would later be adopted by the Kaitakushi, though met with varying success. 
 Kuroda also solicited the advice of Capron and his staff not only on industry and 
infrastructure, but also on government and administrative structures and laws. In the 1871 
annual report, for example, upon Kuroda’s request, Capron detailed the American 
Homestead Act and what incentives were put in place by the American government to 
open up the West to interested settlers. Two years later, Kuroda inquired as to how 
territorial governments had collected and allotted tax money to pay for natural disasters, 
regular repairs, salaries of civil servants, and the care of foundlings.107 In addition, he was 
interested in how land was sold by the government and then taxed.108  In 1875, he also 
asked Capron to share any knowledge he had about the “British system for the 
Government of foreign settlers in Australia and India.”109 Just as the Japanese had 
traveled the globe for the perspectives of the leading nations during the Iwakura Mission 
in the early 1870s, and later invested much time and effort into deciding on a favored 
form of government before promulgating the 1890 constitution, Kuroda and the 
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Kaitakushi were sampling which administrative structures had succeeded under which 
conditions, and might thereby be applied to the governance of Hokkaido.110 This adoption 
of a smattering of bits and pieces of knowledge was generally characteristic of the first 
decades of the Meiji era. 
 Finally, the Americans, as did many other foreign advisors elsewhere in Japan, 
pushed the advantages of mechanization and other labor-saving devices. Prior to his 
departure to Japan, Capron had arranged for the purchase of a number of agricultural 
machines, which rancher Edwin Dun described as including “threshing machines…self 
binding reapers…mowing machines, gang plows; corn planters and innumerable smaller 
machines and implements.”111 Before moving to Hokkaido to attend stock there, Dun 
performed demonstrations of several of these machines at a Tokyo test farm before an 
audience, which included the Meiji emperor and several leading oligarchs. Capron 
justified his reasoning for importing new technologies in that “The time must soon come 
when in the progress of trade, commerce, manufactures…a higher civilization will 
require that in Japan, as in other civilized nations, manual labor shall be supplemented by 
all known forms of mechanical science and ingenuity.”112 While some of these farm 
implements were merely impractical novelties at the time, in a few decades Japan was 
forging ahead on the path to industrialization, creating railroads and telegraphs, erecting 
                                                 
110
 Flexibility to change was specifically written into the official Kaitakushi business plan, in that the head 
(Kuroda) was given the broad powers of “Introducing novel arrangements or deviating from existing rules.” 
See Japanese Government Documents, 71.  
111
 Dun, Reminiscences of Nearly Half a Century in Japan, 13. Dun comments, however, that most of these 
were as useful in Japan as “a fifth wheel would be to a wagon.” See Dun 14. 
112
 Reports and Official Letters to the Kaitakushi, 50. 
  
53 
 
textile factories, and becoming overall an increasingly mechanized society. These early 
examples were a start down that road. 
Conclusion 
 With regard to the development of Hokkaido and the Kaitakushi, Capron rightly 
stated in the first annual report that “the work of this Department should be recognized as 
having not merely a local but a national significance.”113 The work being done in 
Hokkaido during the first half of the 1870s drew up future development plans for 
Hokkaido, and dealt with a number of issues reflective of the overarching challenges 
Japan faced. The Japanese sought outside help from abroad in order to vault Japan into 
the position of becoming a world power. While this process took several decades, it was 
ultimately successful, and Hokkaido was an important part of this. Moreover, when it 
came to Japan’s acquisition and later development of its own empire, it could be assured 
of having faced many of the start-up challenges from planning to develop a region from 
scratch, as it had learned many useful lessons in the first few years of the Hokkaido 
development process.  
 The Capron survey era had legitimized Japan’s claims to Hokkaido and begun the 
process of its development. In 1875, the same year that Capron departed Japan, the 
Japanese formally signed a treaty with Russia that dissolved some of the Russian threat to 
Hokkaido, by ceding its interest in the southern half of Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril 
Island chain, which most closely bordered Hokkaido.114 This made the investment of 
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employing foreign advisors all that much more important, as the focus turned from 
staving off the Russians to eventually making Hokkaido economically viable. While not 
all advice provided by the Americans was ultimately implemented, or when done so, not 
with full success or acceptance by the average Hokkaido resident, the influence of the 
suggestions of Capron’s team and other foreign advisors was evident in the course that 
Hokkaido’s development took with regards to what industries and structures were later 
attempted. The experience gained during this time would be applied to Hokkaido and the 
imperial realm in years to come.  
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CHAPTER 3 – INFRASTRUCTURE, ECONOMY, EXPERIMENTATION, 
 
AND SAC 
 While the path of Hokkaido’s development had been partially laid out during the 
era when Horace Capron and his team surveyed island from 1871-75, the work was just 
beginning. Hokkaido proved to have many resources, though the limited basic 
infrastructure and economy did not attract immigrants to Hokkaido, let alone to actually 
extract the island’s resources. The years after the departure of Capron moved ahead with 
various experimentation, some helpful and some not, as the Japanese attempted to 
implement many of the American suggestions. The Japanese also increasingly sought to 
train and turn tasks over to their own experts, whose knowledge represented a mix of 
foreign training and Japanese perspectives. The development of Hokkaido would prove 
costly to the government, and not always successful. 
The new Meiji government encountered serious financial troubles by the mid-
1870s due to its attempts to modernize quickly, paying out samurai stipends left over 
from the Tokugawa era, and suppressing domestic rebellions. This along with a Hokkaido 
land sales scandal in 1881 embroiled the Kaitakushi in some controversy. The Kaitakushi 
was dissolved in 1882, and Hokkaido was temporarily broken up into three prefectures, 
though much development continued along the same initial plans. Mechanization in 
Hokkaido also didn’t catch on as easily as the Americans had hoped, nor were all 
attempts at producing new crops and raising livestock financially viable. 
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Nonetheless, the development of Hokkaido still provided many valuable lessons 
for the Japanese, adding to a growing body of overall knowledge. Capron’s suggestion to 
establish an agricultural college was carried through by Kuroda and in 1875 Sapporo 
Agricultural College opened. Host to a staff of foreign experts, including former team 
members under Capron, the college quickly became (and remains today), one of Japan’s 
finest. The college was set up as a model to Hokkaido farmers, as well as a site of 
experimentation with new crop varieties adapted to suit Hokkaido’s climate. It also 
provided its students with a valuable liberal and hands-on education. Hokkaido’s 
infrastructure did develop strongly in some regions, though with less success in others. 
The railroads and telegraphs implemented in Hokkaido were some of the first in all of 
Japan. The number of immigrants dramatically increased and reached about one million 
by 1900, as the Japanese adopted some Western crops and developed Hokkaido’s 
transportation system, increasing the availability of food and other goods by the turn of 
the century.115  
Sapporo Agricultural College 
 One of Capron’s most significant suggestions to be realized was the creation of an 
agricultural college. The choice of Sapporo for the college’s location was an obvious one, 
as that was where the majority of Hokkaido’s development occurred. The school was 
founded in 1875 and a year later the Japanese sought a foreigner to take up the position as 
the new Sapporo Agricultural College’s (SAC) first president. At the suggestion of 
Capron, William S. Clark, then head of Massachusetts Agricultural College, was hired for 
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the position.116 Like Capron, he brought along with him a number of Americans who 
would make up the core staff for the new college’s first years.117 Though originally only 
thought of as a school for agricultural training, SAC quickly evolved into a venue for 
both hands-on scientific instruction and education in the humanities.  
The school, at Clark’s request, also took over a recently-established government 
farm and began to test new varieties of crops from abroad while attempting to modify 
them to flourish in Hokkaido’s climate. He wrote to Kuroda asking that the farm be 
placed under the supervision of a foreign agricultural professor, for the “proper training” 
of SAC students to learn “the correct mode of farm management, with due regard to 
economy of labor, the production of profitable crops and stock, and the maintenance of 
fertility in the soil.”118 The attachment of the farm to the college therefore allowed both 
professors and students to engage in hands-on training and experimentation. The former 
was particularly significant, as the first class of students to enter into the college, with 
only one exception, was composed of young men from samurai or daimyo families who 
had little background in practical cultivation.119 The more educated men from samurai 
families, with the experience of scientific agriculture, could quickly transform their 
education into management skills, practical results from their own efforts, or train others 
in turn. 
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Some of the most significant factors holding back immigration to Hokkaido were 
the island’s growing conditions, as well as the continued application of fertility patterns 
that outside immigrants had come to expect in the main islands of Japan. Kuroda, on the 
other hand, was serious in that SAC and the model farms under the college’s control 
would begin to change these patterns, and that this would move Hokkaido closer to the 
goal of being more self-sufficient where foodstuffs were concerned. In an 1876 letter that 
Kuroda wrote to Clark he noted that the “government farm was established for the 
intention of furnishing to the people the examples of agriculture” and agricultural 
methods from abroad. He feared, however, if the farm remained under control of 
Japanese overseers that the methods there, and throughout Hokkaido, would only 
“relapse into the Japanese manner of farming,” negating any previous efforts. He sought 
more permanent changes to Hokkaido’s agricultural structure, concluding his letter: 
Consequently I transfer this farm to the Sapporo Agriculture College and I desire 
to establish a still better mode of agriculture and to cancel entirely all the old 
habits and make new (style system) regulations that shall be everlasting examples 
and to accomplish my original object.120  
 
As emphasized in the Charter Oath, this was yet another realization of the call to do away 
with customs of the past that were ineffective, as Japan pushed towards a more modern 
country. For Hokkaido, adopting Western methods and crops were a part of this effort. 
 Kuroda’s intent was also to have many of the students who graduated from SAC 
eventually become officials in the Kaitakushi and contribute to Hokkaido’s overall 
development. From his point of view, a command of agricultural knowledge was the 
“principal element for opening up and settling” new land such as that in Hokkaido.121 
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William Brooks, the second SAC president, revealed in an 1877 letter to his sister that the 
SAC students were “obliged to sign an agreement that they will remain in this province in 
the employ of the government in return for their education for a certain number of 
years.”122 It quickly became the case in Meiji Japan that the graduates from the top 
universities were quickly snatched up and employed in government service, a practice 
that may have been first modeled by the student-signed SAC agreements.123  
For their part, the first SAC students expressed nationalistic sentiments in that 
they were doing their part in helping to create a strong Japan. In a petition to the then-
president Brooks, twenty SAC students asked Brooks to work them harder with a greater 
focus on hands-on learning. They stated that they were there to “promote the welfare” of 
Japan and help “render our country prosperous.” To do this, they had to acquire more 
knowledge from the foreigners and make the Japanese “agricultural system more 
elaborate and extensive.”124 In a letter to his sister, Brooks quoted some of his 
correspondences with students, and noted that one especially dedicated pupil wrote that 
“Though my soul will leave me, I will never return to my native province unless I finish 
my business or duty.”125 Many such students left behind their families not only for the 
chance to become educated and begin new careers, but also out of a sense of larger duty. 
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One of the elements that set SAC apart from the other colleges being founded 
throughout Japan in the early years of Meiji also had to do with the focus on not just a 
technical, but also a liberal, education. The curriculum during SAC’s first five years 
included advanced science and technical classes in physics, organic/inorganic chemistry, 
botany, anatomy and physiology, horticulture, geology, stock management, veterinary 
science, astronomy, and mechanical engineering. In later years, there was also a strong 
civil engineering component, helpful to the development of Hokkaido’s infrastructure. 
Science and engineering courses paired along with math, from geometry to drafting and 
surveying, and subjects useful to administrators, such as bookkeeping. Humanities were 
also on the schedule, including courses in debate and rhetoric, English literature, and 
history.126  
While the college utilized some textbooks, learning in SAC came primarily 
through lectures, and most importantly, hands-on work in the experimental farm, or in 
practical-learning field trips around Hokkaido. Wheeler, writing in 1880, noted that the 
college was set up to produce not only doers, but also thinkers. He referred to textbooks 
as a “crutch” and preferred oral instruction and interaction between teachers and students, 
arguing that “no system of instruction is better calculated to arouse the thinking faculties” 
of the students, who were constantly cross-examined by one another and by their 
professors, in a continuous cycle of criticism and revision.127 SAC was one of the first 
institutions of higher learning in Japan to combine critical analysis, hands-on learning, as 
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well as scientific and liberal educations, turning from older Confucian-based models of 
education. 
 A few years later, SAC also established a preparatory school to educate students 
in English (speaking, reading, and advanced composition), mathematics, advanced 
Japanese, and some basic history to gain the fundamentals of succeeding in scientific 
instruction in English. Early SAC students were required to have a working 
comprehension of English even to be considered for entry into the school. In his 1873 
report to Capron, Benjamin Lyman indicated his dissatisfaction with his assistants at the 
time. He noted that while they were hard workers, his assistants also were “for the most 
part wholly ignorant at the outset, not only of geology, but of surveying, drawing and 
almost of common arithmetic.”128 Therefore, having a strong background in mathematics 
was essential for field work in Hokkaido, while English was obviously required to 
communicate with the mostly English-speaking foreign staff living in Hokkaido.  
Besides the overall contribution that SAC graduates would make to the 
Kaitakushi and Hokkaido, and the thorough curriculum that the foreign professors 
introduced to their students, the work of the professors in adapting crops to Hokkaido 
was also of critical importance to the island’s development. Throughout the Tokugawa 
era, in a sort of Japanese agricultural revolution, farmers across Japan had heavily 
invested in research and development and experimented in producing larger rice yields. 
They also created varieties of rice uniquely adapted to local conditions. Cash cropping 
had spread throughout Japan and diversified Japan’s economy and number of 
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foodstuffs.129 Much of this knowledge, however, remained highly specialized to 
particular regions, with yield statistics being either unpublished or intentionally hidden 
from tax collectors. When Brooks asked the government for statistics on yields and 
varieties of crops on Japan, the reply came back that “there was none [sic] such statistical 
tables…published before the [1868] revolution.”130 The only national database on 
agricultural statistics before the Meiji era included events resulting from crop destruction 
or famines. Books with agricultural advice had been published, though these generally 
only related to rice-growing practices unsuited to Hokkaido. One of the important 
methods that the Westerners in Japan would introduce was modern bookkeeping 
techniques, and the need to keep exhaustive statistics on everything, including crop 
experiments and varieties, and also to make these available to interested individuals or 
institutions. SAC expected a similar spirit of inquiry from its students, who were to 
utilize the scientific method processes of trial and error, and constant documentation of 
successes and failure. This very closely reflected the larger modernization process itself. 
It’s hardly surprising that the Americans attempted to solve the agricultural 
problem in Hokkaido by importing and experimenting in adapting products from abroad, 
rather than attempting to produce cold-resistant rice varieties, given their lack of 
familiarity with wet rice agriculture. Still, the Americans recognized that the Japanese 
were accomplished agriculturists in their own right. Wheeler, in an 1877 letter, spoke 
highly of Japanese practices, noting that despite the challenges in Hokkaido, “we should 
find it more difficult to supply food for a population of 30,000,000 from an area no larger 
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than Japan…Yet these people have done this for centuries.” 131 The college therefore was 
an important institution in helping the Japanese to get hands-on knowledge of cultivating 
the equally unfamiliar Western crops, enabling the students to learn from the Westerners 
and their ways in only a few years. 
Foreign SAC staff frequently requested new seeds with which to experiment in 
the college farm, requests that seem to have been rarely denied by Kuroda. In one such 
letter, William Brooks declared that he would do his best “not merely to keep the seed 
pure and up to the standard of the original, but also to improve upon it and adapt it to the 
climate.”132 While this was not new to the Japanese, crops from the West benefitted from 
countless generations of human modification and grew in a wider variety of climates. 
Many such seedlings could be readily imported from companies in America or Europe 
and be rapidly tested and adapted to Hokkaido’s conditions.  
Capron’s team started some 40,000 fruit trees and bushes in Hokkaido, including 
“apples, pears, apricots, plums, cherries, grapes…currants, gooseberries, &c.” and had 
grafted together foreign fruits with small native Japanese berry bushes.133 The 
experimental farm established by Capron in Tokyo, though worthless in adapting 
foodstuffs for Hokkaido’s climate, was nonetheless the venue through which “over two 
million of foreign fruit trees and vines were distributed throughout the [main] island of 
Japan and it is from this source that the foreign fruit we get today comes.”134 Though 
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indirect, this was a significant overall contribution to Japan’s foodstuffs that was a 
product of Hokkaido’s development. 
A wide number of vegetables, grains, and grasses were also tested in Hokkaido. 
Some of the food or forage products introduced by the agricultural college and advisors 
included the grains buckwheat, (Japanese) millet, oats, barely, and wheat; vegetables in 
the form of cabbages, onions, legumes, tomatoes, carrots, and some melons, as well as 
variety of American range grasses. Native daikon and foreign white potatoes also 
continued to be grown throughout Hokkaido, the latter being especially successful. The 
SAC professors were careful to make sure the Japanese students got as much hands-on 
time conducting their own “accurate scientific experiments” under the guidance of the 
foreign professors.135 The SAC staff also experimented with chemical fertilizers on 
various imported crops, some of the first such trials to be conducted in Japan. When 
repeated experiments did prove successful, the college began to produce seeds for 
distribution to farms around Sapporo and the immediate region. It was, after all, on the 
wider commercial viability of particular crops or varieties, and not merely success in the 
lab, which would determine whether or not any product was ultimately successful in the 
long run.   
 Though Capron had advocated for it, livestock were only introduced to Hokkaido 
in great numbers after the college was formed, and placed under the care of rancher 
Edwin Dun. These included horses and oxen as beasts of burden, and cattle, sheep, and 
swine for beef, mutton, wool, and pork, and lard, respectively. Dun noted that by “careful 
experiment with over twenty plots of the better kinds of foreign grasses” he discovered 
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that many of the range grasses that “flourished in England or America” would also do 
well in Hokkaido.136 Grass and several types of clover for pasturage were essential in 
supporting the herds of animals that the foreign advisors and SAC professors thought 
would do well in Hokkaido. Such foliage, along with corn and oats, helped support 
animals on the new 35,000 acre Niikappu ranch (established in 1875) and other acreages. 
Horses were initially of particular interest in Japan, as they remained the principle source 
of long-distance transportation in early Meiji Japan. Niikappu, at its start, contained more 
than 1,000 native Japanese mares, along with a stock of Japanese and imported American 
stallions to cross-breed with Japanese horses.137 Part of Dun’s efforts was to breed up a 
stock of hearty horses for use as pack animals in Hokkaido or the main islands, and he 
selectively bred the strongest animals, showing the Japanese how to do the same.138 He 
additionally oversaw the construction of winter animal housing that could stand up to 
Hokkaido’s climate and introduced Western methods for breaking and training horses. 
Despite the best of intentions, there were, not surprisingly, many failures. Clark, 
for instance, had argued on several occasions that not only were traditional Japanese style 
houses “altogether inappropriate” for the cold weather, but that Japanese clothes were 
also not suitable for the weather.139 Instead, he advocated for the use of wool clothing in 
the colder regions of Hokkaido, along with the introduction of sheep to provide the raw 
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materials for spinning. Dun tried just this in Hokkaido, importing a number of sheep, 
which seemed to adapt easily to Hokkaido’s climate. Ultimately, however, the price of 
wool textiles imported from Western factories was three to four times cheaper, while it 
“seemed doubtful if the Japanese would ever take kindly to mutton as a food.”140 
Economically speaking, livestock in general (with the exception of horses) initially 
struggled in Hokkaido. While cows, sheep, and goats produced meat, milk, and butter 
that the Westerners were used to, these animal products initially did little to attract 
Japanese interest, as the Japanese were not used to eating meat.141 Sugar beets had been 
on the list of recommendations proposed by Clark and the SAC staff, and the post-
Kataikushi government heavily invested in sugar refining factories at Sapporo and 
Muroran, which cost two million and one million yen respectively.142 Only one of these 
factories operated for a few years before shutting down, due to cheaper prices that could 
be found in East and South Asia, as well as in the Ryukyu Islands, which were officially 
annexed in 1879.143 Many of the advanced machines for cultivating or harvesting that 
were imported by various advisors also didn’t prove to be either cost effective (human 
labor was cheaper in most cases) or couldn’t be used in the more mountainous terrain of 
Japan.  
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 These and other failures revealed the dangers of accepting the advice of foreigners 
wholesale. Foreign advisors were not always sensitive to cultural differences between 
themselves and the Japanese, such as differences in meat consumption, or assumed that 
the Japanese could and would quickly change all of their ways. Despite the admonitions 
of the Charter Oath, change didn’t always come so rapidly or easily for the general 
populace. The average citizen, of course, made up Japan’s internal market, so what 
initially couldn’t be sold domestically, oftentimes struggled or had to be abandoned 
entirely. Consumption patterns did change, but these changes required new generations 
less invested in traditional patterns of living, or the growth of Japan’s empire into 
territories and markets with different expectations. These failures were also evident of the 
struggles of Japan’s emerging economy in competing with the established West. It was 
particularly revealing of the difficulties inherent in investing in profitable factories that 
wouldn’t be out-produced by their counterparts in the West, where factories were run 
more efficiently and supported by large existing markets. 
 Not all of what came out of Sapporo Agricultural College ultimately proved 
useful, and many research and development investments and efforts were neither 
practical nor profitable. That said, the impact of the college on Hokkaido’s development, 
and even on the main islands, was substantial. Kuroda was confident that “many useful 
men will in the future come out from that college and assist the work of the Department 
so as to accomplish our desired object,” and this hope proved to be correct.144 SAC was a 
training ground for many future Kaitakushi and other government employees, and 
provided a hands-on learning experience where students could cut their teeth through 
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actual fieldwork, while being provided with a liberal education that enhanced their 
analytical skills. Just as important, many graduates eventually passed their skills on to 
their own students in turn. Significantly, about 40 percent of the graduates from SAC, 
between 1880-95, went on to become teachers. Katayama Sen, later founder of the 
Japanese Communist Party, wrote in 1898 that “Sons of the college are conspicuous 
figures everywhere throughout the empire.”145  
For the rest of the populace, the experiments at SAC would provide the 
beginnings of new crops that would supplement the expensive imports from the mainland. 
In the early 1880s, for example, Thomas Blakiston reported eating strawberries in June, 
corn in August, fruits later in autumn, and potatoes that were “exceptionally large, quite 
sound, and of excellent flavour,” in the vicinity of Sapporo.146 Many of the crops 
attempted during this period would become both staple foodstuffs and net exports for 
Hokkaido as a whole (see Chapter Five). 
The Development of an Infrastructure 
 Feeding the populace and training students were not the only tasks faced in the 
development of Hokkaido. The island could have all the economic potential in the world, 
but without much of an infrastructure there was no cost-effective way to extract resources, 
support the needs of a growing population, and move people and ideas about. 
Unsurprisingly, most of the money went to developing the largest existing towns and 
cities, areas near valuable or easily exploitable resources, or low-land areas that had the 
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most agricultural potential. The majority of Hokkaido’s development money was 
expended in the southwest, which fit most of these requirements, and the new capital of 
Sapporo in particular consumed the lion’s share. As Capron’s survey team had 
emphasized, roads were of paramount importance, though creating and maintaining road 
systems in an area with Hokkaido’s land mass and forests was difficult and expensive. 
Communication lines between Hokkaido’s cities and outposts also had to be addressed, in 
addition to trade with the mainland. Beyond that, there was a growing need for 
government and social services. 
 The undeveloped location chosen for Sapporo was a chance to create a new 
modern city with its own particular layout and design. The early capital proved to be an 
eclectic blend of Japanese and American techniques. It was laid out “on the plan of an 
American city, with wide, rectangular streets,” and divided by a grid pattern—unique 
features compared to Japanese cities at the time.147 The housing varied between a 
traditional Japanese style, sometimes unfit for the weather, and the more sturdy housing 
and dormitories built for the foreign advisors, students, and Kaitakushi staff. This 
experiment in modern city-building had its upsides and downsides. Blakiston, who 
watched Hokkaido develop over the course of two decades, was particularly critical of 
Sapporo, stating that it had “all the character of a spoiled child,” due to the particularly 
lavish funding and special attention that went into its development.148 In his eyes, there 
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was “an almost total neglect of other districts,” by comparison, particularly those in the 
north.149  
Economically, Sapporo quickly became the home to several firsts for Hokkaido. 
Isabella Bird, an explorer who traversed the southeast portion of Hokkaido, along with 
large areas of Japan’s other three islands, noted that by 1881 there were “extensive 
sawmills, a silk factory, a tannery, and a brewery, and large flour mills.”150 The mills 
were the suggestions of the foreign advisors, trying to take advantage of the island’s 
extensive timber and new grain cultivation. Sake (rice wine) was a longtime staple of the 
main islands, but foreign beer was new to the Japanese. It was the ability of the Japanese 
to better connect the inland capital to the mainland and the world economy, however, that 
would determine Sapporo’s ultimate success or failure. Initial efforts were made to 
develop the new port of Otaru, some 20 miles to the north of Sapporo, though the largest 
port in Hokkaido still remained Hakodate, even further to the southwest. The early 1870s 
saw the construction of a road of about 100 miles that joined Hakodate and Sapporo, at 
the hefty price tag of 1 million yen. In 1874, a telegraph line (one of the first in Japan) 
had been laid underwater in the Tsuruga Straight between Hakodate and the mainland, 
hooking Hokkaido directly in with Tokyo. Another line soon connected Hakodate and 
Sapporo. 
 Hakodate, as has been mentioned, was initially one of the first ports opened to 
foreign trade, and had flourished because of supplying and coaling the foreign vessels 
that made port there. The port city’s measure of development would come with the rapid 
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creation of its own infrastructure and its significance in domestic trade. By 1881, Bird 
reported that Hakodate was flourishing with seventeen schools (many teaching foreign 
languages), a post office, a customs house, and several ship carpenters. Telling of the 
Western influence, there were a number of Christian churches, as well as shops that 
stocked a variety of foreign goods, and an effective police force.151 Despite a drop-off in 
foreign trade in the 1880s, as well as a devastating fire that destroyed some 8,500 homes 
in 1879, Hakodate was rapidly growing.152 Foreign exports barely doubled to about 
£129,000 in value, though domestic exports increased from a paltry £8,000, to over 
£1,000,000 between 1874 and 1890.153  
This dramatic increase in the amount traded reflects not only the growth of 
Hakodate, but also its increasing connection both to the main islands, and to Sapporo and 
the other developing cities of Hokkaido. Bird noted that “dried fish, seaweed, and skins” 
procured from all around the island were being “sent direct to China and the main 
island[s] in native vessels.”154 Initially, there were only two steam vessels, purchased 
second-hand by the Kaitakushi from the United States in 1872, that serviced the entire 
island and ferried supplies and communications between the mainland and Hokkaido.155 
By 1881, there were five steamers running between just Yokohama and Hakodate at ten 
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days per trip, as well as numerous wind-driven Japanese junks delivering supplies around 
the coastline.156 While these two cities were certainly growing up, and travel by water 
was becoming increasingly easy, overland transportation routes proved more of a 
challenge to construct. 
A number of schemes had been thought up to better connect the capital to the 
world economy, as the road between Sapporo and Hakodate was long and difficult to 
maintain. One of these was to develop waterways, making use of existing rivers and 
connecting canals, though this proved too costly and difficult, and was quickly 
abandoned. The other was to connect Sapporo via a good road to the nearest northern 
coastline and port city there, called Otaru. Between 1880-82, the twenty miles between 
Sapporo and Otaru were bridged not just by a new surface road, but by a new railroad, 
just the third in Japan. This construction was overseen by American engineer J.U. 
Crawford, and built with Japanese labor.157 From Otaru, goods could be transferred to 
more rapid water transportation and shipped to anywhere in Japan or abroad. This railway 
was soon extended thirty-five miles to Poronai, a region that held one of the large coal 
mines discovered by Benjamin Lyman some years before. This allowed for a far more 
rapid extraction and sale of the plentiful Hokkaido coal than ever before. 
Other routes that required less technical knowledge were built on the backs of 
convict labor, along with some paid workers, a practice beginning with the push to 
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construct roads leading into the interior in 1886.158 John Milne later came across as many 
as 1,800 convicts at once building roads in northeast Hokkaido. These individuals were 
made up of common criminals, or those who had rebelled against the Meiji government 
in several rebellions during the 1870s. Milne said that the convicts who had served a 
number of years with good conduct could earn stripes, and when a “convict has obtained 
four such stripes, he may possibly obtain permission to settle outside the prison on a farm, 
and when surveillance ceases, perhaps be absorbed amongst the ordinary colonists.”159 
This was a limited way of populating the more undesirable regions of Hokkaido, as well 
as making improvements to them. The practice of using convict labor, however, also 
partially gave Hokkaido a bad reputation that might have curtailed the immigration of 
potential new settlers. The treatment of some prisoners was particularly harsh and the 
progress toward the interior did cost some lives. Most of inland Hokkaido, outside of the 
area around Sapporo or large resource nodes, however, would still remain the domain of 
forests that were “truly primeval” and difficult to navigate within for many years to come, 
though this was a start.160 
 By 1882, the population of Hokkaido had increased to around 250,000, about two 
and a half times that of when Capron had arrived in 1871.161 This steady increase can be 
attributed to both the increasing number of foodstuffs and the continued development of 
the island’s infrastructure, which resulted in a growth of Hokkaido’s primary cities and 
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economy. The year of 1882, however, would also mark the end of the Kaitakushi and 
many government-operated ventures, as well as the shift away from the use of foreign 
advisors. 
The End of the Kaitakushi 
 The budget of the Kaitakushi was guaranteed for a total of 10 years, from 1872-82. 
The office itself was on shaky ground by that point, however, due to a combination of an 
overall budget crisis and the cost of development programs, as well as an 1881 scandal 
over land and asset sales in Hokkaido. A decade of rapid change and attempts to revamp 
Japan economically, politically, intellectually, and culturally had come at a high 
monetary and personal cost, prompting the young Meiji government to literally have to 
fight new battles, and slow down from its initial pace. Hokkaido was caught up in all of 
these events. 
 Besides the heavy investment in foreign advisors and technologies, the samurai 
were also largely responsible for an ongoing budget crisis. In 1873, the government 
raised a new conscript army drawn from men of all classes, though the soldiers mostly 
came from the ranks of the farmers. It later specifically forbade the samurai their 
traditional privilege of wearing two swords, while the advancement of the peasants to 
soldiers ended the samurai’s role as the sole protectors of Japan. Initially, the samurai 
retained their traditional yearly stipends, though the cost on the young government was 
too great. It began offering samurai their total stipends in single lump-sum bonds, 
supposedly worth five to eleven years of a man’s salary. In 1876, this change was made 
mandatory for all. Rampant inflation and a fluctuating currency meant that many samurai 
actually got very little spending power from their bonds, effectively ending the lifestyles 
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they and their ancestors had enjoyed for hundreds of years and reducing them to abject 
poverty.162 This crisis, along with the removal of their symbols of power, pushed many 
samurai to the edge, and in 1877, the Satsuma Rebellion broke out, led by Saigō 
Takamori, formerly one of the most powerful leaders of the Meiji oligarchy. While the 
new conscript army (which Kuroda helped partially lead) succeeded in defeating the 
samurai rebels, the financial cost to do so was immense, further straining the government 
reserves. 
 This ongoing budget crisis began a period of belt-tightening, a fiscal pullback 
after a decade of heavy spending. Hokkaido, along with the rest of Japan, felt the impact 
of this. William Wheeler noted in 1877 that “throughout Japan, all departments have an 
abundance of schemes for improvement in hand” but the government was “too poor to 
pay for them all,” particularly now that the “war has crippled her [Japan] still more 
seriously.”163 Shortly thereafter, Wheeler reported that the government reduced the 
salaries of officials by twenty percent across the board and put a moratorium on hiring 
new foreign professors at SAC. Instead, it designed to replace those departing the college 
with top graduates from Tokyo University, some experienced SAC graduates, and 
Japanese who had studied abroad.164  
While the intent was never to have costly foreign employees in place forever, the 
budget crisis hastened the transition from foreign teachers and experts to native Japanese 
ones. Besides their cost, historian Fujita Fumiko, writing about the foreigners employed 
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in Hokkaido, also notes that there was some “difficulty [in] employing individualistic 
foreigners,” many of whom were overconfident in their cultural superiority to the 
Japanese.165 Such cultural differences might have played a factor in cutting the positions 
of foreigners, along with the continuing English-Japanese language barrier. More than 
that, however, was a continuation of the Japanese goals of learning from the West in 
order to stand on par with them. This could only be accomplished through Japan’s own 
unaccompanied success in the modern world. 
 While these transitions weakened the expensive Kaitakushi, still only able to 
recoup a portion of its development expenses in any given year, it was a scandal that saw 
the close of the office. Having reached the end of its tenure, the Kaitakushi began selling 
off some of its assets in order to pay for the many continuing industries (not all 
immediately profitable) that it still funded. A private company consisting of current and 
former Kaitakushi employees, and backed by merchants from Osaka, Japan’s wealthiest 
port city and home to much of its financial community, was formed. It proposed to buy 
the governments’ assets, including such things as offices, warehouses, ships, factories, 
breweries, farms and buildings, canneries, and port facilities. 
Kuroda praised the move, and in a long statement, argued that “Businesses that 
should be in the hands of the people should be released from government control,” and 
that those who had already contributed so heavily to the development of the island should 
continue to see it on its way to success, even if in a private capacity.166 Kuroda might 
have been influenced by Capron, who had insisted through his reports that “It has been 
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the experience of England and America that such enterprises are never productive of so 
satisfactory results under government auspices as when left to individual effort,” though 
it was also the overall intention of the Meiji government to transfer many start-up 
industries into private hands eventually.167 During the course of a political struggle 
between Meiji oligarchs, however, it was revealed to the public that the assets of the 
expensive Kaitakushi were being sold off for only three percent of their projected value. 
The ensuing scandal cancelled the sale, painting Kuroda’s intentions in controversy. 
Kuroda attempted to procure further funding for the continuation of the Kaitakushi, 
though this was denied. Kuroda quickly resigned, the Kaitakushi was dissolved, and a 
temporary government was put in its place. 
 The change to Hokkaido was more symbolic than actual. Soon after, Hokkaido 
was split into three prefectures, which were also quickly abolished in 1886, and replaced 
by a more consolidated government, though still mostly under the heel of the central 
government in Tokyo. These new entities retained many of the same staff and kept the 
same laws that were in place under the Kaitakushi, and attempted to oversee industries in 
much the same way as before, albeit with less funding. Immigration did begin to pick up 
during the 1880s, mostly due to poor economic conditions on the mainland for many 
Japanese. In the case of the samurai, their bond money was likely running out. From 
1882-1889, the central government (much as the Kaitakushi had done) set aside 150,000 
yen annually as loans to samurai families willing to immigrate to Hokkaido. This time, 
almost 7,500 families were recruited, triple that of previous attempts, while farmers also 
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began to make the move in larger numbers.168 The employment of some foreign 
engineers continued, though they were increasingly replaced by Japanese ones. With the 
improving infrastructure, and a decade’s worth of experience in new farming techniques, 
the prospects of Hokkaido began to attract more immigrants, as well as investors who 
could provide needed capital. The Hokkaido Coal-Mine Railway Company was 
established and helped construct additional rail lines and expand the coal mines.169 The 
investment of imported knowledge and the hard work of the Japanese were beginning to 
pay off. At the turn of the century, almost a million Japanese called Hokkaido home, a 
dramatic increase from the early years when the island was still called Ezo.  
Conclusion 
 Over its ten year tenure, the colonial office and the development projects in 
Hokkaido drew their fair share of supporters, detractors, and those in between. For 
instance, in 1881, Isabella Bird stated of the Kaitakushi that “This department has spent 
enormous sums upon Yezo, some of which have been sunk in unprofitable and costly 
experiments, while others bear fruit in productive improvements.”170 Some foodstuffs 
were very successful, while other elements of Western technology, crops like sugar beets, 
or livestock such as sheep, were not. Two years later, Blakiston noted in 1883 that 
“Almost every article required for use in daily life,” outside of some foodstuffs, lumber, 
and coal was still imported.171 Labor was generally still more expensive in Hokkaido than 
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the main islands, while many Japanese were initially hesitant to give up their traditional 
diets and relied on the import of such goods as rice, miso (fermented bean paste), or sake. 
The flurry of initial development would only begin to take a firm hold in the decade after 
the office of the Kaitakushi was abolished, when some early projects began to find some 
success. 
John Milne wrote that by 1893, “One hundred and ninety-six miles of railway are 
nearly completed, roads have been constructed, farms of various descriptions established, 
coal mines opened, canning establishments, hemp, and other mills started, and fisheries 
encouraged.” While he was quick to point out that “most” of the government’s attempts 
at development had been unprofitable, he nonetheless emphasized that largely “owing to 
the Government’s assistance, Yezo is becoming populous and self-supporting.”172 That 
Hokkaido was becoming self-supporting was fulfilling a major goal. No longer was 
Hokkaido merely spotted with a few small colonies to prevent a Russian land grab; rather 
it was also beginning to produce its own goods, take on its own character, and become an 
irreplaceable part of Japan proper. Hokkaido was undergoing the transition from an 
external colony to an internal land. The initial investment may have been significant, and 
like any new experience it was fraught with much trial and error before paying any 
dividends. And dividends it would pay. 
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CHAPTER 4 – PROGRESS, THE AINU, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
 There is one final element of Hokkaido’s development to consider between 1868-
1900. Hokkaido was an experiment in colonialism, and an attempt to turn the land itself 
into a useful and productive machine from which goods might flow to enhance the 
empire, in addition to providing additional living space for the Japanese. The other 
remaining aspect of this learning experience was in regulating the peoples who had 
originally made Hokkaido their home before the arrival of the Japanese. By the time 
Japan opened up to the West, several centuries of Japanese-Ainu trade and relations had 
taken their toll on the Ainu, a process continued by the modernization of the Meiji era. 
 Contrary to the actions of the Matsumae during the Tokugawa era who had 
compelled the Ainu to appear as a barbarous other, the Meiji government attempted to 
force upon the Ainu the trappings of Meiji-style civilization. This included attempts to 
regulate the Ainu’s appearance and hunting practices, the latter to encourage them to 
settle down and farm. Though the Ainu were initially protected from some of the 
requirements of modern society by certain legal and tax exemptions, they were not able 
to make their way easily in the modern economy and society that was rapidly being built 
up around them. Entire communities were sometimes uprooted and moved to make way 
for Japanese progress. In 1899, they were stripped of any remaining legal protections, and 
classified by the ambiguous title of “Former Aborigines.” Thereafter, they were forced to 
make their living as Japanese citizens, yet without the benefit of actually being ethnically 
Japanese, or being fully integrated into Hokkaido’s citizenry or economy.  
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The Ainu proved themselves to be agents of environmental change, utilizing their 
hunting and fishing skills to provide the growing population of Hokkaido with skins, 
meat, and fish. A combination of the large influx of Japanese immigrants, the demand of 
Hokkaido goods in the mainland and abroad, and new technologies that increased the 
efficiency of game and fish harvesting, when combined with improved transportation 
systems, quickly devastated local animal and fish populations. Ainu guides would be 
instrumental in exploring Hokkaido’s forested inland, including aiding the foreign 
advisors in their travels. Finally, the relationship between Ainu and Japanese in the 
underdeveloped portions of Japan was not always as strained as the relationship between 
the Ainu and the Japanese government. In these areas, the Japanese, though often 
exploitive of Ainu labor, also shared goods, ideas, and spaces with the Ainu. Through the 
use of their traditional skills, the Ainu were able to express some of their own agency, 
however limited, in the development of Hokkaido. 
The Ainu in a Modernizing Japan 
 Through trade with the Matsumae clan, the earlier subsistence patterns of the 
Ainu had been altered to make many Ainu tribes semi-dependent on the Japanese for 
foodstuffs and had commoditized the hunting practices of the Ainu. The Matsumae had 
taken advantage of their distance from mainland Japan to forcibly conscript Ainu to work 
at southern Ezo fisheries. The Ainu labored under sometimes harsh conditions, often with 
little or no pay.173 Some of these abuses were ended when the Tokugawa government 
took over control of the island from the Matsumae in the 1850s, and again when the 
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Kaitakushi was established to oversee the renamed Hokkaido in 1871. The Kaitakushi 
and subsequent governments operated with the goal of assimilating the Ainu into the 
Meiji state. While outright abuses by the government might have ended with the 
transition from Tokugawa to Meiji, and though the Kuroda and the central government 
prescribed that the Ainu be treated well, these actions did not necessarily change the 
views of many Japanese toward the Ainu, who the Japanese saw as uncultured and 
uncivilized. Nor would these prescriptions immediately improve the poor social and 
economic condition of the Ainu, even those tribes who had not been directly exploited by 
the Japanese.  
 Upon their arrival on the scene, Westerners overwhelmingly commented on how 
seemingly thin the Ainu appeared in body, mind, and population after the impact of 
hundreds of years of even a partial Japanese occupation of the island. John Batchelor, a 
missionary who devoted much of his life to the improvement of the Ainu after his arrival 
to Japan in the 1870s, said of the Ainu that they “were one and all imbued with the 
inferiority complex” as a result of their interaction with the Japanese. He continued that 
“They had been thoroughly cowed and became hopeless,” and “knew themselves to be a 
doomed race.”174 The Matsumae had also discovered the weakness of Hokkaido’s natives 
to alcohol. This had prompted the Matsumae to import a steady stream of sake to Ezo, 
where the drink became an important trade good between the Japanese and Ainu, as well 
as between Ainu tribes. Sake found its way into Ainu rituals, creating alcoholism 
amongst the Ainu, who the Japanese and Western observers unilaterally agreed drank 
heavily. Bird noted the continuation of this practice in 1881, as she witnessed numerous 
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Japanese “horses laden with sake going to the interior” for trade with the Ainu.175 The 
influence of the Japanese, labor exploitation, and alcohol “gradually degenerated” the 
condition of the Ainu, according to Dun, who thought “their spirit as a people was broken 
and ‘sake’ and disease did the rest.”176  
Disease had weakened the Ainu in the Tokugawa era, though this continued 
during the Meiji period as well. Despite some attempts of the Japanese to vaccinate the 
Ainu, many were still vulnerable to diseases introduced by a growing number of Japanese. 
Unable to cure it on their own, the Ainu often had no choice but to flee at the appearance 
of smallpox in their villages. St. John observed in 1880 that when faced with the disease 
that the “Ainos immediately disperse into the interior when this dreaded disorder reaches 
them, and break up into small bands until it is over and past.”177 This major disruption 
could be temporary or permanent, depending on the number of victims. 
Besides these challenges, the Japanese government also increasingly tried to 
regulate the daily lives of the average Ainu, attempting to force the Ainu to conform to a 
more modern Japanese-like appearance. Ainu men traditionally wore flowing long hair 
and grew beards just as lengthy. The Japanese, however, encouraged or outright forced 
many Ainu to shave their heads. During the Tokugawa era, long hair worn in topknots 
was common for Japanese men, though in an effort to visually remake themselves like 
the Westerners, it was expected that most Meiji men wear short hair. For the Ainu, long 
hair was representative of long life-spans, and cutting a man’s hair was therefore 
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equivalent to shortening his life. The Ainu also feared that enemies could harm them 
through black magic rituals involving their hair.178 Ainu women also traditionally 
practiced tattooing their lips blue, beginning in a small area on the upper lip, then 
spreading to both upper and lower lips, while circles were tattooed on their forearms. 
When Isabella Bird toured a Japanese village forbidden to perform the practice, she noted 
that the inhabitants “expressed themselves as very much grieved and tormented by the 
recent prohibition of tattooing,” fearing that their gods would be angry with them.179 The 
Ainu told Bird that without such tattooing, their women couldn’t marry, and begged her 
to speak to the government and try to get the Japanese to overturn the law. Instead of the 
Ainu being made out to be barbarians by the Matsumae in the Tokugawa era, they were 
now expected to conform to the new Meiji expectations of what a civilized people should 
look like. This expectation was carried out without consideration for what these changes 
might have meant for the Ainu and their traditional culture. 
The Japanese government did not stop at appearances. It also attempted to 
regulate the hunting and subsistence practices of the Ainu. To the Ainu, bears were 
sacred, as was the practice of hunting them. While the Meiji era Japanese considered 
bears a nuisance that occasionally killed horses and sometimes even people, the hunting 
practices of the Ainu also proved an issue of contention. To better enable them to hunt 
bears, the Ainu had long utilized a number of potent poisons, applied to their weapons, in 
order to slay their dangerous prey. This also included setting poisoned arrow traps to 
remove the dangers of direct confrontation. This proved a problem in modern Hokkaido, 
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however, as traveler Edward Morse discovered in 1878 when he unknowingly wandered 
onto such a hunting ground and was only warned back by the cries and gestures of local 
Ainu.180 Hidden traps and errant poison arrows were more dangerous to the increasing 
number of foreign travelers and Japanese settlers than they were to the Ainu who knew 
their local hunting grounds. Therefore, the Japanese government decided that the use of 
such poison had little place in a modernizing Hokkaido. 
 While fishing had become a less exploitative profession in the Meiji era and many 
Ainu had begun working in the emerging logging industries, the government’s preference 
was for most tribes to settle down and take up agriculture as a primary means of earning a 
living. While Kuroda apparently never solicited the advice, Capron had nonetheless 
offered it during his time in Japan. He wrote that he foresaw the “same difficulties are to 
be encountered in efforts to civilize these people” as the American government had faced 
in its expansion westward. From his perspective, Capron warned that the Ainu and 
American Indians shared a “fondness for the chase, and for an exiting and almost 
irresponsible life, with a corresponding distaste for steady and industrious application.”181 
Dun similarly claimed that they had excellent woodcraft skills, though “soon tire of 
steady employment.”182 It’s unclear to what extent Capron influenced any of the policies 
of the Kaitakushi toward the Ainu, though the path that the Kaitakushi took certainly 
followed an attempt to get the Ainu to settle down and become proper Japanese citizens. 
As farmers, the Ainu would conceivably contribute to the state and be more easily 
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controlled, rather than living outside of it. Seasonal wage earning was therefore 
discouraged in lieu of agrarian pursuits. 
 The little agriculture practiced by Ainu tribes didn’t fit into the Japanese model. 
Bird reported that the Ainu cultivated an area until “nothing more” would grow there, 
then they would “partially clear another bit of forest, and exhaust that in turn.”183 This 
practice encouraged mobility and expansion, and didn’t stay within the borders of 
delineated private property, even as the best land was slowly being divided up between 
incoming immigrants. For settlements further inland where the primary source of 
foodstuffs was not fish, Benjamin Lyman, in his travels to the interior, commented that 
the “forest is their garden,” and that the Ainu there hunted and gathered foodstuffs, 
clothing materials, and trade goods from wide swaths of land.184 This traditional way of 
life clashed with the expectations of Meiji Japanese. Forcing the Ainu to settle down 
would keep them from trespassing on new private property, plug them into the Japanese 
economy, further increasing their reliance on Japanese goods, while decreasing any 
competition between the Ainu and immigrant Japanese for forest goods gathered in 
unsettled areas. 
 Congregating the Ainu in specific areas also made it easier for the Japanese 
government to remove them when it suited Meiji progress. The creation of the 
aforementioned 35,000 acre Niikappu ranch, for instance, came at the expense of the 
Ainu who had lived there. Kayano Shigeru, an Ainu descendant, writes that the Japanese 
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desired the Ainu lands for their fertility or for the availability of game. The grasslands of 
Niikappu were one such area, from which entire Ainu villages were forcibly relocated. 
Kayano says that “The Ainu could not comprehend being told to move from the fertile 
region they had inhabited for generations to a barren land.” He lamented that there was 
“no way to prevent the overwhelmingly powerful shamo from forcing the reluctant Ainu 
off of Niikappu.”185 The Ainu, of course, had long since settled on the best lands 
available to them for the benefit of their people, though the Meiji state saw itself as 
taking priority over the Ainu’s existing habitations. Similar relocations happened all 
around Hokkaido at least twenty times between 1872-1902.186  
The most extreme dislocation came when Japan signed over its interests in 
Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Island chain. Japanese assimilationist policy tried to 
portray all Ainu as part of the Japanese state, so when Russia took formal control of 
Sakhalin, the Ainu living there were relocated across the sea to Hokkaido. William 
Brooks spoke to an Ainu chieftain from Sakhalin, who longed to return to his old home, 
and said that the move and the new climate of Hokkaido had weakened his people and 
that “the deaths in his tribe now outnumber the births.”187 
 Besides competition for land, there also was a growing antagonism for resources, 
as more immigrants arrived. Beginning in 1871, money was pumped into Hokkaido, not 
for the benefit of the Ainu, but for modern development and for the sake of interesting 
potential Japanese immigrants. Whatever the success of individual Kaitakushi programs, 
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the result overall was a dramatic increase in the island’s population. In 1873, the official 
Ainu population of Hokkaido stood at around 16,000. By 1903, it was closer to 17,500. 
However, during this same period, as Japanese immigrants trickled, then poured, into 
Hokkaido, the Ainu went from being about 15 percent of the island’s population, to 
barely more than 1.5 percent.188 Even if some Ainu suddenly gave up their native 
traditions (many did not), they still found difficulty competing against the sheer numbers 
of Japanese now making the island their home and employed in its industries. The 
Japanese brought their own economy to the island with them, something from which the 
Ainu were still culturally estranged. Jobs for which Japanese merchants utilized the Ainu 
were limited to labor or work that made use of their traditional hunting, fishing, or 
guiding skills, even as the government officially attempted to transition the Ainu to 
agriculture. 
The spread of Japanese influence was also clear in other ways. While Ainu 
nomenclature was kept in some instances, the rebranding of Ezo to Hokkaido (“northern 
road”) was also imposing upon the island a new ‘Japaneseness,’ and served to claim the 
island and its lands against both the Russians and the Ainu. Benjamin Lyman, in his 
many surveying field expeditions across Hokkaido, remarked that the Japanese explorers 
and assistants who accompanied him often renamed geographical features they 
‘discovered’ and noted such locations under their new names on field maps.189 Even if 
native place names were utilized, they were still written so as to be pronounceable in 
Japanese with katakana, or even outright assigned particular kanji readings on printed 
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maps.190 The name of Sapporo, for instance, was taken from an Ainu word, but was 
written in kanji, not katakana. Foreigners or Japanese who didn’t know better would see 
such kanji and only casually assume them to have always had Japanese names, another 
important part of the process of claiming Hokkaido and the Ainu for the Japanese and 
assimilating them into Japan proper. 
The final element of the attempted assimilation of the Ainu was education. Before 
1900, no serious attempt was made at educating all of the Ainu of Hokkaido. Instead, 
what education there was for the Ainu in the 1870s was more experimental in nature, as 
the Japanese sought to see if they could educate the Ainu in new Japanese ways. These 
attempts took Ainu boys and men of various ages, not always voluntarily, both to Tokyo 
and Hokkaido’s larger cities, where the focus was placed upon the scientific-style 
Western agriculture that was being imported through Hokkaido. Again, opposite the 
Tokugawa era Matsumae practices where knowledge of Japanese was supposedly 
forbidden to the Ainu, the learning and use of Japanese was now required for Ainu pupils. 
Educators in such schools made no attempt to preserve the Ainu language, and instead 
pushed the acquisition of Japanese as a tool of assimilation. Many of these experiments in 
education were ended when officials noted that the Ainu who returned to their villages 
after a period of education once again took up their traditional practices and didn’t pass 
on what they had learned to their fellow Ainu.191 In the 1880s until the end of the century, 
most Ainu education came through the form of foreign missionaries like John Bachelor, 
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though rarely with the support of the Hokkaido government. Only after the 1899 Former 
Aborigines Act was passed did the government seriously undertake the education of the 
Ainu.  
All of these elements combined to create a deep distrust on the part of the Ainu 
towards the Japanese government, while Japanese administrators were mutually 
distrustful of the Ainu. When Isabella Bird visited an Ainu village to the south of 
Sapporo, she inquired about their customs, though “Before they told me anything, they 
begged and prayed that I would not inform the Japanese Government that they had told 
me of their customs, or harm might come to them.”192 While their fear might have been 
exaggerated, it’s clear that the government was putting pressure on the Ainu to remain 
mum on any cultural differences between themselves and the Japanese. The drive to end 
the external differences of the Ainu from the Japanese was also accompanied by a desire 
to make the Ainu culturally more like the Japanese, and not express their native culture or 
share it with outsiders, who might emphasize the uniqueness of Ainu traditions. St. John 
mentions that during his travels, within one village he encountered, “Japanese law [was] 
publicly read every 15th of November,” to remind the Ainu there of their obligations to 
the Meiji state.193 Lyman, when out looking for mineral resources, was told by 
government officials that they had sent advance scouting parties into Ainu territories 
because the Ainu supposedly had “so much dislike to reveal the mineral resources of their 
hunting grounds” that the government suspected the Ainu were intentionally hiding their 
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knowledge of such resources.194 These clashes pulled the Ainu even further away from 
the government. 
Through a variety of methods, the Meiji era governments of Hokkaido attempted 
not only to make the former Ezo into an internal part of Japan, they also tried to do the 
same with the Ainu. In contrast to what occurred during the tenure of the Matsumae in 
the Tokugawa period, the Meiji government tried to make the Ainu look and behave 
Japanese, even if they weren’t. This included prohibitions on hairstyles and tattooing, 
while the government tried to push the Ainu away from wage employment and to settle 
down permanently as farmers, even as it outlawed some traditional hunting practices. 
Such attempts at integration were pushed aside when Ainu villages stood in the way of 
progress and many Ainu were forcibly relocated for the benefit of the Japanese.  
The Ainu, Japanese Immigrants, and the Toll on the Environment 
 Actual Japanese acceptance of the Ainu varied between regions. An examination 
of frontier lands reveals that tensions between the Ainu and Japanese were not so great as 
between official government policies and the Ainu. Here, where the Japanese and Ainu 
often had to work together to prosper and survive, both cultures took useful elements 
from one another, while some intermarriage existed. Divisions between Japanese and the 
Ainu were more dramatic in more developed regions, where Japanese cultural 
expectations clashed with the values of the Ainu. The new economy of Hokkaido was 
initially very reliant on goods from natural industries, something to which the Ainu with 
their hunting and fishing skills contributed heavily. The gathering of game and fish was 
sometimes taken to an extreme in order to satisfy Hokkaido’s own food requirements, let 
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alone to export foodstuffs and other goods to mainland Japan, or even abroad. Here, the 
Ainu would leave their own mark on a changing Hokkaido ecosystem. 
During the Capron survey period, the Ainu had been invaluable serving as guides 
and as labor to help pack surveying instruments and foodstuffs for both Japanese and 
Western explorers. Lyman, who spent more time in the interior than many of the Western 
advisors, consistently lavished praise on the ability of the Ainu to carry heavy loads in 
rough terrain. He said that only “About once in two thousands steps the Ainos would stop 
to rest, and it seemed to a greenhorn astonishing that they could carry such loads even so 
far as that,” while Lyman, despite being an active man, struggled with just a small 
pack.195 The utility of the Ainu was also valuable to such expeditions, as no one was as 
skilled at living off of the land as they were. Lyman found them always to be in good 
humor during such expeditions and observed that his guides “seemed equally to 
understand all the affairs of backwoods life” and traveled together without sense of clear 
leadership, but instead with a “common understanding” that didn’t necessarily require 
words.196 The Japanese often learned hunting or fishing techniques using spears and 
hooks from the Ainu in order to at least subsist and later profit off of the land. Most 
Japanese were respectful of the Ainu woodcraft skills. Lyman, for instance, saw Japanese 
boatmen give up control of their craft to the more experienced Ainu navigators, and 
commented that never in his several years in “Yesso have I been able to see the least 
jealousy or hatred between the Ainos and Japanese” who lived there.197 
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 For settlers, marriage (however formal) between Japanese men and Ainu women 
did certainly occur, as multiple sources observe. A.H. Landor, who toured Ainu villages 
throughout Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands, wrote that “Intermarriage between the two 
races is frequent, not to say common; and therefore a large average of the population…is 
composed of half castes, and even second and third crosses.”198 Blakiston and Milne also 
noted that they encountered similar practices.199 Individuals of a mixed race probably 
were registered under Ainu census rolls rather than Japanese ones, if at all, while Landor 
estimated that somewhere in the vicinity of half of the Ainu he encountered were of 
mixed ethnicity. In some cases, the unions between Japanese men and Ainu women were 
short lived, as evidenced in one example given by Batchelor, where a Japanese man who 
had to return to the mainland “refused to take” his wife  “with him because she was 
tattooed,” and wouldn’t be accepted into his native village. On one hand, this 
demonstrated that Japanese men weren’t unwilling to eschew ethnic purity while on the 
frontier, though at the same time, such unions were limited to the area of Hokkaido, and 
not beyond. 
 Besides tattooing, there were many other physical and cultural differences that 
may have set the average Japanese apart from the Ainu. While Lyman observed that he 
was “satisfied on the whole the Ainus are no more hairy than Caucasians,” the hairiness 
of the Ainu (including body hair) was strange and off-putting to some Japanese, who 
largely lacked body hair, especially with new Meiji prescriptions on having a clean-cut 
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appearance.200 A major cultural difference came in views on bathing. Shintoism, the 
native animistic religion of Japan, values cleanliness and requires purification for a 
number of rituals. Japanese culture, from its earliest origins, therefore valued cleanliness, 
and frequent bathing was long an established practice. This included avoiding tasks that 
might cause defilement, such as hunting, encountering blood, or working with the 
carcasses of dead animals or human bodies, activities in which the Ainu were involved.201 
The Ainu were less accustomed to bathing, a fact many Japanese found loathsome, and 
may have caused frequent skin diseases among the Ainu.202 Travelers such as Landor, 
who stayed in Ainu huts, also reported that their huts were often infested with flies, 
attracted by refuse that was not disposed of outside the village.203 Other cultural values, 
though more subtle, may have also played a role. Ainu chieftains were more figureheads 
than wielders of actual power, something that didn’t fit in with a more hierarchically-
oriented Japanese social structure. Ainu women, though they had some different roles in 
religious rituals and weren’t hunters, more or less did much of the same work as many of 
the men, especially when it came to fishing. Though the gender roles of Japanese peasant 
women in the Tokugawa period were largely equivalent to those of men, the increasingly 
affluent Meiji society began to create a greater separation between the spheres of men 
and women. 
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  The relationship between the average Japanese and the Ainu, was therefore more 
ambivalent than that of the official government and the Ainu. Isabella Bird was assigned 
an assistant who was a former samurai, and when Bird chastised him for poorly treating 
the Ainu they encountered, he replied, “They’re just dogs, not men.”204 This was one 
extreme. Most individuals from samurai origins, however, had a stronger sense of 
cultural superiority than did the poorer classes which Hokkaido’s promise initially 
attracted. It was the poorest laborers, who worked beside the Ainu, and not the 
government officials and former samurai who relied on Ainu knowledge the most. The 
poor had the least distance between themselves and the Ainu. Still, the Ainu would never 
be Japanese. Blakiston commented that “although [the Ainu] have been recognized of 
late years by the government as having equal rights,” he doubted “that they will ever 
regain a status of equality” because of continuing cultural differences.205 
Some differences were not only cultural, but economic. The number of trades to 
which the Ainu could apply their traditional skills were limited, and the commoditization 
of Ainu hunting and fishing knowledge, combined with Hokkaido’s modern economy, 
was ultimately the undoing the Ainu and some of Hokkaido’s native animal populations. 
Evident in the progress of Hokkaido’s development was such environmental degradation. 
Deer, wolf, and salmon populations dramatically decreased throughout the island due to a 
combination of the demand for goods, the protection of livestock against predators, and 
Ainu and Japanese overhunting and overfishing.  
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The tale of Hokkaido’s wolf has been well documented by Brett Walker in The 
Lost Wolves of Japan. For the Japanese peasants of the Tokugawa era, wolves had been 
worshiped as deities that kept herbivorous animals from eating their crops. In Meiji 
Hokkaido, however, with the introduction of large numbers of stock animals to the island, 
wolves, as Walker argues, became “‘noxious animals’ who needed to be killed…in the 
context of Japan’s burgeoning industrial order.”206 Edwin Dun, who was initially 
responsible for the care of many of the imported animals and whose views on pastoralism 
had great influence on the Japanese, played a major role in the destruction of Hokkaido’s 
native wolf population. In attempting to establish the large Niikappu ranch, for instance, 
Dun wrote that “to our horror we discovered that wolves with which that part of 
Hokkaido was at the time infested seemed competent to devour horse flesh rather faster 
than we could produce it.” In his attempts to breed ninety mares, all of whom had colts, 
he returned to the pens where the animals were kept after a period of a week’s absence, 
only to find that all of the colts had been killed, with their bones “scattered all over the 
place.”207 Owing to this new source of meat, the wolf population temporarily boomed, 
and killed increasing numbers of the stock that the Japanese and their foreign advisors 
were already struggling to establish in Hokkaido. Wolves in this case were not a helpful 
deity, but a bloodthirsty animal standing in the way of Hokkaido’s development. As a 
result, Dun and the Japanese began poisoning horse carcasses, resulting in massive 
casualties in the wolf population.208 The government also enlisted the Ainu as wolf 
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bounty hunters, who were paid for every proven wolf kill they turned in.209 This 
movement extended beyond Hokkaido, and by 1905, the entire wolf population of Japan 
was extinct, a result in which the Ainu played a large part. The bears of Hokkaido, 
important to many Ainu rituals, were also placed on the list of undesirable predators, 
though they didn’t suffer the same fate due to their smaller populations and less 
socialized hunting practices. 
Changing times also devastated Hokkaido’s deer, particularly in the south. 
Following the advice of Capron, the Kaitakushi established several canneries to pack, 
preserve, and export meat. While most of these were designed for salmon and other fish 
goods, the government also built several canneries for venison. Deer meat was consumed 
by the Ainu, foreigners, and a growing number of Japanese, who took up the practice of 
hunting or purchasing meat out of necessity, during the period of transitioning from 
living on the mainland to living in Hokkaido. Moreover, deer skins were of increasing 
demand for export and use in mainland Japan. With the growth of foreign trade, the deer 
antlers were desired by the Chinese, who ground them up and used them as a curative. 
Deer had moved from being merely a foodstuff, to a product for which there were 
multiple uses. Dun reported when one particularly harsh winter in 1878-79 confined 
herds of deer to lowland areas, still heavily snowed under, that the “Ainu on snow shoes 
overtook them easily and slaughtered many tens of thousands with clubs and dogs.” 
Some “75,000 skeletons were counted in the spring,” the result being a “practical 
extermination.”210 Blakiston noted seeing several canneries, the “use of which has 
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become obsolete, owing to the deer seldom if ever now resorting to this part of the 
country.”211 The venison boom had ended due to overhunting. The lack of profitability 
closed the expensive deer canneries entirely, for want of local deer to can. Only through 
the intervention of the government were limits on hunting put in place, which allowed the 
deer populations outside of the west to slowly recover.212 Of course, such limits also hurt 
the Ainu who relied on the income and foodstuffs that hunting provided for them. The 
Ainu, initially shunning efforts to get them to become farmers, attempted to make their 
living through traditional means. Need to subsist and high Japanese demand had pushed 
them to overhunt particular areas. The trade was therefore very good for a few years, 
though it was quickly crippled, to the detriment of the Ainu. 
Finally, the Ainu were employed in fisheries throughout Hokkaido. Japanese 
workers regularly came and went on a seasonal basis, though it was the Ainu who lived 
in most fishing villages year-round and who most heavily relied on the proceeds that 
salmon fishing brought in. Dun in particular complained about “companies over which no 
restraint nor control of any kind was exercised.” Unregulated fishermen deployed a 
virtual gauntlet of nets and traps that prevented many fish from reaching their spawning 
beds, not allowing the fish to regenerate their population. As a result, the “the yearly 
catch was but a small faction of what it had been” compared to the times where the 
salmon runs had swelled the banks of Hokkaido’s rivers.213 Only after this dramatic 
decrease did the government see fit to establish a fisheries commission for tighter 
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regulation of Hokkaido’s fishing. This would, again, serve to push the Ainu away from 
easily accessing one of their traditional methods of food gathering. 
Conclusion 
The rapid modernization of Japan and the industrialization that would come 
certainly had its side effects. In the effort of the Japanese government to become equals 
with the West, some things were to be lost along the way as lesser priorities. The Ainu 
were one such casualty. In the Meiji era, the Japanese government sought to end cultural 
and physical differences between the Ainu and the Japanese by banning the practice of a 
number of traditional Ainu customs. The government attempted to make the Ainu settle 
down to control them more easily, while demonstrating its true intentions in favoring 
Japanese interests over Ainu ones in the frequent displacement of Ainu villages for 
Japanese progress. Despite such assimilationist policies, the attitude of the government 
and many citizens toward non-Japaneseness revealed a number of Japanese cultural 
biases that would later play out in external colonization. 
 Civilization was also brought to Hokkaido in terms of economics, as Hokkaido 
developed around, not with, the Ainu. The devastation of Ainu foodstuffs and trade goods, 
often at their own hands, did as much as anything to change Hokkaido’s environment and 
the traditional patterns of the island’s natives. The influence of foreigners and the 
opening of Japan to the world’s markets were also obvious in what was intentionally 
destroyed, overhunted, and overfished, including wolves, deer, and salmon respectively, 
as Japan tried to grow strong. The biodiversity of Hokkaido due to the loss of these 
animals was therefore quite altered from its original state.  
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 When initial attempts at forcing the Ainu to settle down were frequently 
unsuccessful, along with the economic need to find new roles for them, the government 
passed the oddly worded 1899 Former Aborigines Act. The very title implied that the 
Ainu had to become like modern Japanese, yet would still be wholly prevented from 
doing so by their ethnic and cultural heritage. The actual tenets of the act gave all Ainu 
small plots of land where they were supposed to farm, incentivized by tax waivers, 
though also bound by the fact that the Ainu could not sell the plots if they wished to 
continue their traditional ways of life. The new law provided medical subsidies for the 
poor or ill, while requiring education for younger Ainu. Children were taught in 
segregated schools, however.214  On the surface this was billed as a series of social 
programs to aid the increasingly destitute Ainu, though at the same time, the law was also 
the final assimilationist hammer, which ended many Ainu attempts to retain their 
traditional lifestyles and live apart from the modern Japanese state. 
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CHAPTER 5 – HOKKAIDO AND THE EMPIRE BEYOND 
 
 The story of Hokkaido and the lessons learned in the island’s initial development 
does not end in 1900. Many of the individuals trained directly by foreign advisors went 
on to become significant figures in their respective fields, while later iterations of 
Sapporo Agricultural College continued to turn out high achieving graduates. In the space 
of a few decades, Japan had learned how to navigate its way among the modern world, 
the results of which were evident in its expanding empire, economy, military, and overall 
industrial growth. Japan acquired new additions to its empire through wars against China 
and Russia. In 1895, Japan was awarded the island of Formosa (now Taiwan) as a result 
of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and regained the southern half of Sakhalin in 1905, 
out of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). In the industrial age, Japan was the first non-
Western nation to defeat a Western power in a war, and found that its influence and 
markets in East Asia expanded dramatically as a result. Japan would formally annex 
Korea in 1910, ending Russian interest and Chinese influence there, while it would also 
acquire Manchuria before reaching its colonial peak during World War Two. 
 The administration and development of some colonies, such as Formosa and 
Sakhalin, showed the influence of the earlier work in Hokkaido. Formosa was an 
unplanned spoil of war with China and the island itself was in an undeveloped state and 
presented challenges not dissimilar to those of Hokkaido. Throughout its growing empire, 
Japan faced difficulty in attracting settlers to populate its new acquisitions. The 
infrastructure and economy of Formosa were very much embryonic, while the island had 
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an existing aboriginal and immigrant Chinese population, which the Japanese attempted 
to assimilate. Similar to the Japanese government’s stance on the Ainu, it attempted the 
assimilation of the inhabitants of Formosa, and later Korea, by a combination of the 
denial of native culture, while endorsing Japanese ethics, practices, and language. Japan 
also attempted to erase many of the differences between the Japanese and colonial 
citizens in Formosa and Korea, though as was the case with the Ainu, Japanese cultural 
biases prevented most assimilationist policies from being implemented as they were 
originally intended. The development of Hokkaido also proved invaluable when Japan 
acquired the southern half of Sakhalin, as the Japanese faced many of the same problems 
with encouraging immigration and providing foodstuffs as they had encountered in 
Hokkaido. 
 Not only would the experience earned in Hokkaido’s development turn out to be 
important to Japan’s later colonization, but Hokkaido would become (and remain until 
today) one of the largest producers of many of the agricultural and livestock products 
introduced by foreign advisors in its early stages of development. The coal of Hokkaido, 
along with many other minerals, plus timber, would also become important resources that 
would help propel Japan’s industrialization and allow Japan to become the dominant 
economy in East Asia, eventually outcompeting the Western colonies there. Such 
resources would also play a role in the years leading up to the Second World War. 
Hokkaido’s post-war population would rise to as high as five and a half million people, 
while the capital of Sapporo is currently Japan’s fifth largest city. Though the island’s 
population density is low compared to the rest of Japan, Hokkaido has nonetheless made 
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a successful transition to becoming an integral, indispensible part of Japan, and still 
offers important natural resources and potential expansion room. 
Hokkaido’s Place in the Empire after 1900 
 Japanese who had worked with or under foreign advisors and technicians during 
Hokkaido’s initial development period frequently went on to become influential in their 
own right. Two of the top assistants of J.U. Crawford, who had built Japan’s third railway 
connecting Sapporo and Otaru, eventually became in quick “succession chiefs of the 
Imperial Government Railways,” the governmental bureau that thereafter oversaw the 
construction of all new railways throughout Japan.215 These later railways would be 
developed with minimal input from foreign sources. In the days that Benjamin Lyman 
had conducted his geological surveys of Hokkaido, he took pains to ensure that his 
assistants had been educated sufficiently in surveying and map drawing practices, and 
also in leadership roles, even if projects took longer to finish. His assistants therefore 
gained the practical experience to later undertake surveys themselves. He claimed that his 
assistants were not only the “first Japanese but the first Asiatics to undertake the study 
and practice of geology.” The Japanese, in his view, would “become in a few years 
independent of foreign countries in their profession.”216 This proved correct, as not only 
did Lyman’s assistants later hold positions in the Mining Bureau, but they also 
discovered two large mineral deposits in 1880 and 1888 during surveying expeditions.217 
The goal for the Japanese had never been merely to have foreigners do all of the work for 
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them, but to take the lessons provided by the foreigners to heart and go on to implement 
them and become accomplished technicians in their own right. 
 By 1890, SAC sported an all-Japanese teaching staff.218 It was later renamed and 
reorganized, losing some of its focus solely on agricultural education, before later 
becoming Hokkaido Imperial University in 1918, one of nine such imperial universities 
throughout the Empire of Japan. Some notable graduates would include figures like 
Yanaihara Tadao, later Chancellor of Tokyo University, and Hashimoto Tanzan, a post-
war prime minister. Less prominent figures included the previously noted large numbers 
of teachers who came out of the university, and whose example would inspire a 
generation of Japanese who came of age with the turn of the century, as Japan was 
making itself into a true world power. As Sen had noted, graduates of SAC were indeed 
“conspicuous figures…throughout the empire.”219 
 The greatest deterrent to Japanese immigration to Hokkaido was solved in the first 
decade of the twentieth century by the persistence of local Hokkaido farmers. A “new 
type of quick-maturing rice plant” was developed for use in Hokkaido.220 This and other 
new varieties were engineered to ripen quickly and mature for harvest before the harsh 
Hokkaido frosts set in. This allowed the Ishikari to blossom as a rice-growing plain. 
Agriculturists were also able to develop a crop that grew quickly enough to be practical 
for use even in the more frigid northern and eastern portions of Hokkaido. By the 1950s, 
Hokkaido would only import 20 percent of its rice from elsewhere in Japan, whereas at 
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the start of the Meiji era, this figure was closer to 100 percent.221 None of the eventual 
successes with rice cultivation invalidated the introduced crops or minerals discovered in 
the time of the Kaitakushi, while the contributions of the foreign advisors did not become 
became any less important, however. Rice was obviously not an export product of 
Hokkaido, though other goods were. 
 Coal, discovered by Lyman and his former assistants, became one of the principle 
exports of Hokkaido. Even by 1893, John Milne reported that domestically, “Yezo coal is 
already largely used on the railways, at manufactories, and on steamships.” Moreover, 
Hokkaido’s coal was “rapidly increasing” its “influence on Eastern commerce” and 
becoming a product sold abroad in Hong Kong and Shanghai.222 Profits from coal alone 
would increase from 3.9 million yen in 1900, to 196.4 million in 1940, as Hokkaido’s 
industry and transportation systems were built up to support heavy, regular extraction.223 
Hokkaido deposits represented about half of Japan’s coal reserves, even if the production 
of Hokkaido lagged behind that of the more developed southern island, Kyushu. 
Hokkaido only produced about a quarter of Japan’s total coal before World War Two. 
This coal, however, was hailed as having “The highest calorific value of coal” of Japan, 
or the coal that produced the most energy per volume.224 A headline in the Los Angeles 
Times from 1906 proclaimed that England was by that time losing its grasp on the coal 
markets of Asia. The article noted that Japanese coal was “expelling English coal from 
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China, the East Indies and India.”225 In 1913, Japan imported a mere three percent of the 
total coal that it consumed.226 Though Japan is usually characterized as having little in the 
way of mineral deposits, coal was one exception. Hokkaido in particular had active mines 
producing iron, cobalt, chromite, mercury, tin, asbestos, barite, pyrite, and sulfur.227 Even 
if Japanese mineral deposits were not sustainable in the long-term, they nonetheless also 
gave Japan a boost to catch up quickly with the West. The early availability of such 
resources also created markets and products for the long-term demand for certain 
minerals, and such growing need would materialize itself in the period of Japanese 
colonization from 1895-1945. 
 The non-rice agriculture of Hokkaido also took off, as did profits from fishing and 
the timber industries. Hokkaido was home to much of Japan’s corn and grass products 
and was the sole supplier of oats, which were used to fatten up animals and sate a 
growing demand for meat. Hokkaido produced as much as half of Japan’s potato supply, 
almost all of its flax, and two-thirds of its pyrethrum (an important product used as a 
natural insecticide around the world before the introduction of now-banned chemicals 
like DDT).228 Besides the sulfur it produced for use in chemical fertilizers, Hokkaido 
farmers also frequently utilized animal fertilizers as well as fish products to enhance their 
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crops. By 1940, Hokkaido’s timber industry had grown to 34.2 million yen annually, as 
the island’s comparatively voluminous forests came under regular exploitation. This 
helped to not only supply an industrializing Japan with wood, but “surplus timber in 
Hokkaido” was also being exported as building materials and “railway sleepers…to 
China and Korea.”229 The fishing catch, worth 12.3 million yen in 1900, soared to 305.6 
million (worth more than coal) in 1940.230 Hokkaido became the home base for Japanese 
trawlers (no longer wind powered) that sailed to the north, fishing from the plentiful 
fishing grounds around the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. Canning salmon, a practice 
suggested by Capron, became automated and sold well both domestically and abroad. 
Overexploitation of Hokkaido’s rivers had forced the Japanese to travel into deeper 
waters in search of salmon and other fish, another reason for the outward push of 
Japanese sea boundaries. 
Japan’s consumption of meat did increase dramatically, as statistics of livestock 
slaughtered reveal, jumping up by three to four times between 1900-1940. Hokkaido 
possessed large numbers of stock and produced about a third of the milk of Japan. Even if 
meat didn’t come directly from Hokkaido, breeding stock likely did, and the average 
weight of livestock in Japan also increased notably.231 The legacy of the work done by 
Edwin Dun in this regard was significant. Even prior to the war years, the Japanese 
Imperial Army had been a big purchaser of Hokkaido horses for use in transporting men, 
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goods, and weaponry in Manchuria and later across China’s eastern seaboard.232 Despite 
the frustration encountered by Dun, residents of Hokkaido still ran sheep across the island, 
from which they produced wool. Animals, along with fishing, provided an important 
foodstuff for Hokkaido, which still had little farm ground. As late as the 1950s, Hokkaido 
only possessed 6.4 percent of the cultivated land of all Japan, mostly due to its 
comparatively mountainous and forested terrain.233 
Hokkaido was by no means the most significant of Japan’s islands with regards to 
its material contributions to the empire. The impact and continuing potential of 
Hokkaido’s products in Japan are nonetheless very substantial. After the turn of the 
twentieth century, Hokkaido became largely self-sufficient in terms of foodstuffs, while 
building up massive profits in its biggest industries of fishing, coal, and timber. Even 
decades later, the impact of the foreign advisors and SAC staff could still be seen in the 
foods consumed by residents around the island, as well as those all across Japan. 
Japanese agriculturists also proved their own skill in finally developing varieties of rice 
that would grow in Hokkaido’s climate, making immigration to the island even more 
attractive. The population of Hokkaido tripled to 3,173,000 people by 1940, 
demonstrating that Hokkaido was fully integrated into Japan proper by the outbreak of 
World War Two in Asia.234 Equally important was the continuing influence of those who 
had trained under the foreign advisors, or who graduated from Sapporo Agricultural 
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College and its later iterations, many of whom became teachers or important leaders in 
the Japanese government. 
The Legacy of Hokkaido in the Growing Empire 
 The influence of the lessons learned in Hokkaido also becomes clear upon an 
examination of the Empire of Japan at large, while difficulties in several colonies mirror 
many of those faced in Hokkaido. Japan did not plan for the acquisition of colonies like 
Formosa any more than the young Meiji government had time to create intricate designs 
for the assimilation of Ezo/Hokkaido into part of Japan proper. While different 
circumstances and environments dictated separate approaches to colonization from that of 
Hokkaido, the framework through which the Japanese developed their new colonies was 
often similar to that of Hokkaido. This was particularly evident in the case of Formosa. 
 As a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Japan acquired the island of 
Formosa out of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which required China to cede the island and 
pay the Japanese an indemnity. The war had broken out over competing interests in 
Korea, with the Japanese surprisingly proving victorious, supplanting China to become 
the dominant power of East Asia. Japan’s only involvement with Formosa before the war 
was for a short period in 1874, when Japanese military forces had invaded the island as a 
direct response to the execution of a number of its shipwrecked sailors by Formosan 
natives (one of the same reasons that the West had desired to force Japan open two 
decades before). Many Japanese, however, quickly justified Formosa’s place in the 
expanding Japanese Empire as a natural one. Shinichiro Kurino, Japanese Minister to the 
United States, reflected this view in an interview shortly after the Japanese gained 
possession of Formosa. He stated “Formosa is essentially a part of a long train of the 
  
110 
 
Japanese islands. These run from [Yezo] down to Nagasaki…Formosa is a natural part of 
this chain.”235 Just as the Japanese had perceived Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands as being 
a natural part of the Japanese archipelago in the early Meiji era, so too were similar 
justifications given for Formosa’s inclusion in an expanding Japanese island chain of 
influence. 
 Though its population was in the millions, consisting mostly of Chinese and some 
aboriginal peoples, Formosa was in a relatively underdeveloped state in 1895. In his 
interview, Kurino stated that Japan did, however, have experience in working under such 
circumstances and that it had had “some degree of success” in its efforts to develop 
Hokkaido. He argued that “Formosa will prove a more tempting field for immigration, 
especially to the inhabitants of Southern Japan,” than the colder and undercapitalized 
Hokkaido did.236 Moreover, Formosa did have a geographical advantage; unlike 
Hokkaido, the warmer southern climate of Formosa was suitable for rice agriculture. 
Formosa is additionally less than half as large as Hokkaido, easing transportation and 
requiring less development over a smaller area. While Formosa didn’t need to be 
populated for purposes of labor as was the case in Hokkaido, the infrastructure and 
economy of Formosa were largely nonexistent. Like the Kaitakushi, government offices 
were set up and given a fixed annual amount for development projects. 
 Formosa, unlike Hokkaido, was developed by Japanese experts, not foreign ones. 
Modernizing food production was again among the early objectives in Formosa’s 
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development. Shimpei Goto, a governor-general of Hokkaido, wrote that one of the early 
tenets of the government’s development programs was to “appoint men specially 
qualified to instruct and direct the people” in the ways of modern agriculture.237 Shimpei 
hoped that these undertakings, so “zealously promoted by the government,” would “be 
conducted in such as a way as to furnish successful models for private enterprise” and 
encourage continuing capital investment in Formosa’s development.238 These quotes 
almost exactly mirror the policies of Kuroda in establishing the Kaitakushi and SAC as 
examples from which the people might learn and begin to implement, while 
simultaneously attempting to attract external private investors to fund industries after the 
government’s initial help.  
 Meanwhile, the government focused on the construction of infrastructure to 
encourage the development of self-supporting industries, while implementing social 
programs designed to proliferate Japanese control over Formosa’s population. This 
enhanced their ability to be productive subjects for the empire. Besides its annual 
operation budget, the colonial government was authorized to raise a loan of some 35 
million yen, the principle of which was used to build a railroad connecting the island’s 
northern and southern halves, while also providing for general improvements, the 
construction of sea ports, and the creation of government buildings. The government 
connected Formosa and the mainland with several undersea cables, contracted shipping 
businesses to supply the island, and built telegraph offices all over Formosa.239 The 
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government instituted complete monopolies over camphor, salt, and opium, using the 
proceeds from each to fund the island’s continuing development, similar to the 
Kaitakushi’s monopoly over fishing rights in Hokkaido.240 
The Japanese also implemented compulsory public education, setting up schools 
across Formosa. The curriculum in these institutions included reading, writing, 
geography, arithmetic, history, and especially instruction in the Japanese language. This 
education also came with a heavy dose of Confucian ideals, promoting loyalty to the new 
Japanese colonial rulers. Telling of the intention of the Japanese state to create doers and 
technicians, not thinkers, education in literature, law, politics, or philosophy was 
discouraged. Patricia Tsurumi, historian of Taiwan’s education system under Japanese 
colonialism, argues that the strong focus on Japanese language and history was to “detach 
each Taiwanese from any past he or she might perceive,” and encourage loyalty to and 
assimilation into the Japanese state.241 The Japanese also created teacher-training schools 
and established Taihoku Imperial University in modern day Taipei.242 Schools were 
segregated (as they had been between Japanese and Ainu in Hokkaido) between those for 
the native inhabitants of Formosa, the ethnic Chinese majority, and Japanese settlers.  
 The natives of Formosa, according to Kurino, were “savages, who live by 
hunting” and who also “tattoo their faces and skin” and were organized in tribes.243 
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Unlike the Ainu, who hadn’t rebelled against Japanese rule since the eighteenth century, 
some of Formosa’s native peoples were actively organized and resisted the Japanese, 
violently in some instances. As a result, many of the Japanese who occupied the island in 
the early stages of colonization were police or military men. From the Japanese 
perspective, the natives were an impediment to stability and order. In a 1910 government 
report detailing the state of forestry in Formosa, the author noted that with regards to the 
timber industry, “Until these barbarians are tamed and made good citizens of the empire, 
the utilization of these forests…is next to impossible.” Through a combination of 
economic pressure, education, and (unlike Hokkaido and the Ainu) outright might, the 
author bluntly noted that the natives were slowly coming under imperial authority and 
being “converted into what is called ‘tamed savages.’”244 
 The warmer Formosa could actually support rice agriculture, though the island’s 
climate also possessed its own dangers. Diseases, particularly malaria and smallpox, were 
rampant throughout the island. These killed a number of Japanese during the early 
occupation of the island. Disease discouraged the immigration of Japanese settlers, 
prompting the government to introduce strict sanitation practices, create drainage systems, 
and establish hospitals. Mandatory vaccination was introduced for the natives, who most 
often carried the diseases. They were vaccinated in the tens of thousands, a tool of 
assimilation similar to the attempts of the late Tokugawa government in Hokkaido.245 
 Japan shocked the world in 1905 when it emerged the victor against Russia in the 
Russo-Japanese War. Though the small return was much protested in Japan, the Japanese 
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Empire merely received the southern half of Sakhalin (called Karafuto by the Japanese) 
through treaty with a beleaguered Russia, in the midst of the 1905-08 revolution. Besides 
cementing Japanese interests in Korea, this further extended the chain of ‘Japanese’ 
islands now stretching from Formosa in the south to Sakhalin in the north. The Japanese 
had been one of the first non-native explorers of Sakhalin in the Tokugawa period, while 
there were some Japanese living in the southern half of Sakhalin before the 1875 treaty 
with Russia swapped Japanese influence on Sakhalin for the sole possession of the Kuril 
Island chain. Acquisition of Sakhalin also went with the official government line, that all 
Ainu were subjects of the Japanese Empire.246 
Sakhalin, like Hokkaido, did not posses an environment conducive to rice 
growing and was even colder than its southern neighbor. Hyman Kublin, writing on the 
evolution of Japanese colonialism, correctly argues that the “late nineteenth century 
experimentation in the development of Hokkaido was to furnish experience fruitfully 
applied in South Sakhalin.”247 The list of prominent crops grown in the Japanese half of 
Sakhalin, including buckwheat, barely, oats, wheat, potatoes, beans, sugar beets, grasses, 
and hay, almost precisely matches the non-rice crops that were attempted and that had 
flourished in Hokkaido. Cattle, sheep, and hogs also provided an additional boon to the 
island’s food supplies. Though agriculture existed under the Russians, as an observer in 
1945 noted, the “scientific guidance of the Japanese” eventually developed the island’s 
agriculture into “something considerably more important and profitable.”248 Lucrative 
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industries included the exploitation of timber and coal, while the Japanese retained the 
rights to pump oil on the northern Russian half of the island until 1944. In 1940, the 
Japanese were able to extract four million barrels of oil from Sakhalin, which represented 
a quarter of all domestic Japanese production.249 Just as important as the island itself 
were the fishing rights of the plentiful northern waters, and the Sakhalin ports at which 
Japanese fishing vessels could resupply and unload their catches for processing. These 
elements partially helped Hokkaido fishing to blossom into the 305.6 million yen 
industry that it had become by 1940. Sakhalin’s profitable products included herring, 
which was still used as a fertilizer, and crab, among other marine products.250 Due to 
these agricultural successes, along with Hokkaido’s conditioning of immigrants to live 
and prosper under colder conditions, the population of Sakhalin increased from a mere 
12,000 in 1906 to 415,000 people in 1940, and was officially considered an “internal 
land” along with Hokkaido and the main islands by the same year.251 This was unlike 
Formosa or Korea, which were treated as colonies for occupation and exploitation. 
 The history between Japan and Korea is far more storied than that of Japan’s other 
colonies. The second of Japan’s unifiers, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, had attempted to invade 
Korea twice between 1592-98, but his soldiers were repelled by the Koreans and their 
Ming Chinese allies. Japan had only maintained minimal diplomatic relations with Korea, 
while the island han of Tsushima had an isolated trading post on the Korean coast after 
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Japan had limited its foreign trade and relations during the Tokugawa era. After the 
transition to Meiji occurred, and Japan began to reassert itself in East Asia, the Japanese 
took a page from Matthew Perry’s book, and in their own act of gunboat diplomacy, 
forced an 1876 treaty upon Korea, opening up formal diplomatic relations and treaty 
ports to Japanese trade. Relations between Japan and Korea remained strained, 
particularly after Japanese agents assassinated the Empress Myeongseong in 1895 in an 
attempt to influence Korean politics. 
As the Japanese established the imperial buffer zones of Hokkaido, the Kurils, 
and Sakhalin to the north, and Formosa to the south, they justified their interest in Korea 
as a security issue. Yamagata Aritomo, then Prime Minister of Japan, wrote in 1900 that 
Korea was only separated from Tsushima by a “mere girdle of water,” and that if Korea 
“were to fall under occupation by someone else, our people no longer [sic] sleep 
undisturbed.”252 With the defeat of China and Russia, Japan gained control over Korea in 
1905, and formally annexed it in 1910. This completed a trend of competition with 
Russia over expanding Japanese spheres of influence, which had begun with the 
development of Hokkaido. Japan had now insulated its main islands to the north, south, 
and partially to the west. 
Korea was by far the most developed colony that Japan possessed, having its own 
existing complex history and heavily populated society. The Japanese tried to control the 
Koreans, as was the case with the Ainu and in Formosa, through attempts at assimilating 
them into the empire. The Japanese argued that because they shared so many cultural 
similarities with the Koreans, they would be successful at assimilating the Koreans, rather 
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than merely ruling over them. Mark Caprio, writing on the Japanese assimilation 
practices in Korea, notes a specific reference from Japan’s time in Hokkaido. Caprio 
relates the instance of Kita Sadakichi, a Ministry of Education official, who “justified 
Korean assimilation by claiming Japan’s success in assimilating the Ainu, a people he 
argued to be now ‘almost indistinguishable’ from Yamato Japanese.”253 This was again 
attempted through a combination of education, the encouragement of Japanese language 
studies, and the raising of Korea’s infrastructure. As was the case in other instances, 
however, the actual cultural biases of the Japanese became obvious as the Japanese 
segregated themselves in separate spheres within Korea and invested in education only to 
the point of improving the production power of their colonial subjects. Koreans were 
often described by the Japanese as being ‘dirty,’ an epithet similar to Japanese 
descriptions of the Ainu.254 Caprio argues that as is the case in Korea, the Japanese 
people could not ever accept peoples of a different ethnic heritage as equal citizens. This 
was evident in earlier policies toward the Ainu. The government itself sent out mixed 
messages with labels like “Former Aborigines” and its dual encouragement and 
exploitation of colonized or ‘assimilated’ peoples. 
Like Formosa, Japan’s approach to Korea was to convert the peninsula into what 
Samuel Pao-San Ho calls an “agricultural appendage,” which would produce rice and 
other goods to keep Japanese prices down, while providing a market for Japanese 
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manufactured goods.255 As was initially the case in Hokkaido, the Japanese government 
had trouble encouraging Japanese citizens to take up residence in any colonial areas. By 
1935, the Japanese had only settled 2,168,000 citizens abroad, or only about 2.9 percent 
of the total population of Japan, which was topping 70 million by the 1940s. Japanese 
abroad only constituted 5.3 percent of the entire population of Formosa, and less than 
three percent in Korea and Manchuria.256 In comparison, more Japanese had settled in 
Hokkaido than all the external Japanese colonies combined, while among all their 
colonies the Japanese only made up a large percentage of the population in Sakhalin, 
which was about four-fifths Japanese. Japan, like Germany, had sometimes justified its 
colonization in terms of gaining room to expand. Despite the tightly packed population of 
its main islands, however, immigration statistics don’t reflect the desire of the average 
Japanese to immigrate abroad. Colonies were therefore more for their resources than 
room to grow, at least from the perspective of Japanese citizens. 
Similarly, Japanese policy in Manchuria was mostly focused on what the Japanese 
could get out of the area. Between the beginning of war between Japan and China in 1937, 
the breakout of World War Two in Europe, and the involvement of the U.S. in the Pacific 
War in 1941, the Japanese managed to conquer the eastern seaboard of China and most of 
Southeast Asia. Though the Japanese encouraged nativist movements in Southeast Asia 
to uproot the British, French, American, Portuguese, and Dutch colonial powers there 
with the promise of an ‘Asia for Asians,’ the Japanese quickly lost any early favor they 
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had curried there due to oppressive and self-serving policies.257 It was here in particular 
that the Japanese cultural biases, evident in Japanese-Ainu relationships beginning in 
Hokkaido, manifested themselves as the Japanese tried to accumulate resources from 
these newly conquered lands. Ultimately, when the U.S. war machine ramped up after 
America entered the war, the Japanese were entirely out-produced. The tiny island nation 
overextended itself, with Japanese ambitions outpacing their ability to secure resources, 
deal with the limitations of its population, and fend off the Americans.258 Though the 
Japanese Empire ended after World War Two, one of the reasons that the Japanese were 
so successful in their empire building in the first place was due to the Hokkaido 
experience. 
Therefore, the development of Hokkaido was a proving ground for the Japanese. 
Whereas American technical knowledge helped to develop Hokkaido, it later was the 
ability of the Japanese to apply the techniques of scientific agriculture adopted from the 
West, along with the technical abilities to create an infrastructure from scratch (as in 
Formosa and Sakhalin) that allowed Japan to create the empire that it did. In Japan, rice 
was king, while Japanese citizens were hesitant to immigrate abroad. These challenges 
were faced in Hokkaido, and again in its colonial ventures. Sakhalin in particular adopted 
the same crops that flourished in Hokkaido. In Formosa and Korea, the Japanese 
attempted to assimilate the native peoples there through selective education, Japanese 
language training, and social and infrastructural programs. Unlike with the Ainu, who 
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were few in number and who had already suffered centuries of Japanese manipulation, 
the populations of Formosa and Korea in particular already had their own cultural 
precedents, and were less receptive to sometimes transparent Japanese self-interest and 
segregation of native peoples. 
Japan and Hokkaido after World War Two 
 Japan was entirely divested of its colonies following its unconditional surrender 
of the Japanese to the Allied Powers in 1945. Though the Empire of Japan wasn’t 
officially dissolved until the installation of a new constitution in 1947, the Japanese 
colonial age ended with its wartime defeat. Japan had possession of Formosa/Taiwan for 
fifty years, control over half of Sakhalin for forty, had influenced Korea even before its 
thiry-five years of official power there, while it maintained parts of China for a decade 
and a half. All of these colonies were either returned to their original owners or were 
placed in the hands of Western victors, America and the Soviet Union. Even the entire 
Kuril Island chain, partially discovered by the Japanese in the Tokugawa period and 
granted to Japan through a non-wartime treaty in 1875, was occupied by the Soviet Union. 
 The lone exceptions to this list are the Ryukyu Islands, conquered by the Satsuma 
han and made into a tributary in 1609. The other, of course, is Hokkaido, only formally 
annexed in 1869. The question of Hokkaido’s ownership was never even on the table as 
Japan surrendered, even though the remainder of the empire was swiftly cut apart. 
Beginning mostly with the declaration of the young Meiji emperor and the new 
government to develop Hokkaido, the Japanese steadily claimed unchallengeable 
dominion over the entire island. Though the actual initial stages of Hokkaido’s 
development from the 1870s-90s were often fraught with difficulty, high costs, and 
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numerous failures, in the end Japan still retained Hokkaido after the conclusion of the 
Second World War. Indeed, the average Japanese today would never begin to question 
the issue, nor did any Westerner following the end of the war. 
 It was instead the Ainu who were the losers in Hokkaido’s development and 
Japan’s colonization of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. So well had the Japanese 
established that the Ainu were Japanese subjects that most of the native Ainu of Sakhalin 
were ‘repatriated’ after the war, being forced by the Russians to move to Hokkaido. The 
Cold War that quickly followed separated and kept apart families and friends, at least 
until relations with Russia improved decades later.259 The situation was similar in the 
Kurils, where the Russians occupied all of the islands, from those in the north to some 
that are visible from the coast of Hokkaido. The Hokkaido government maintains several 
pages on its website, claiming that the Kurils are “Japanese territory we have inherited 
from our ancestors” and that the “islands are currently illegally occupied by Russia.”260 
This remains little consolation for the Ainu, who were only formally recognized as a 
separate indigenous ethnic group by the Japanese government in 2008, reversing the 1899 
declaration denying their separate non-Japanese heritage. 
 Hokkaido today boasts a population of about 5.5 million, while Sapporo has 
grown into Japan’s fifth most populous city. Overall, it is still mostly the southwestern 
area around Sapporo that is the most densely populated, while only 4.3 percent of 
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Japanese overall live in Hokkaido.261 If anything has been indicative of the success of 
Sapporo and Hokkaido as whole, it’s the world-wide recognition the island garnered from 
being the host to the 1972 Winter Olympic Games. 
 The legacy of the Kaitakushi and the foreign advisors is also clear when 
evaluating the products that Hokkaido produces today. The natural resources so lauded 
by the foreign advisors are still top products of Hokkaido. The island’s timber represents 
sixteen percent of Japan’s forests. Hokkaido’s fishing grounds provide about a third of 
Japan’s annual catch, now an almost 300 billion yen industry. Coal mining in Japan has 
mostly petered out after decades of heavy exploitation during the colonial and war years, 
and again as the Japanese economy rose from the ashes in the 1940s and 50s to become 
one of the world’s largest, though Hokkaido still supposedly possesses large reserves.262 
Hokkaido only generates 7.3 percent of Japan’s total rice crop; however, it produces the 
largest quantities of many products originally imported in the 1870s. This includes such 
foodstuffs as wheat (61.5%), adzuki beans (88.5%), onions (56.9%), green corn (47.8%), 
potatoes (77.7%), kidney beans (95.5%), pumpkins (49.8%), and grasses and other 
forage-stuffs (65.1%). Other products include carrots (30.3%) and soy beans (21.7%). 
Interestingly, despite their initial failure, Hokkaido produces all of Japan’s sugar beets, 
one of the few sources of  domestic sugar after the loss of imports from Formosa. 
Hokkaido also possesses more than half of Japan’s total dairy cows, horses, and sheep, 
with about a fifth of its beef cattle.263 
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 Other influences that Hokkaido has historically had upon Japan are harder to 
quantify. What is clear, however, are the number of parallels and outright inspirations 
that Hokkaido had on the larger approach to Japanese colonization before World War 
Two. This came in the manner in which colonies were developed effectively with 
Japanese technical skill, some of which was born in Hokkaido, while also informing the 
exclusionary yet assimilationist policies that were used to manage subjects of the empire. 
Japan had learned the ‘great game’ of the West and created its own colonies beyond the 
island. Hokkaido’s role in Japanese history has been a small but important one, as it made 
the transition from outer to inner land. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Hokkaido was a small, but important, part of Japan’s modernizing process, the 
influence of which cannot be underestimated. The period between the 1870s-90s was 
generally a critical period of transition for Japan. Japan modernized, as did Hokkaido, 
though not before experiencing a number of failures. The Japanese, with some initial help, 
managed to develop Hokkaido into a land almost self-sufficient, in terms of food, in just 
a few decades, while populating the island with millions of Japanese by World War Two. 
Hokkaido made many contributions to the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa economies in terms 
of coal and other minerals, lumber, fish, and other foodstuffs and products. Its 
development also contributed valuable knowledge that helped translate into the dramatic 
growth of Japan overall, while the individual wielders of technical and scientific 
knowledge assisted Japan’s advance from below.  
The impact of the United States in Hokkaido’s development is clear in the 
methods and laws employed by the Kaitakushi. Many of the crops recommended and 
tested in the 1870s-80s are still grown in Hokkaido, though in varieties that are now even 
more suited to the island’s environment. The Kaitakushi’s foreign advisors were 
responsible for the importation of countless fruit trees seeded around Japan, while some 
of the Japanese desire to consume meat came out of the number of animals introduced 
into Hokkaido. Hokkaido’s quick adoption of the techniques of scientific agriculture 
helped to feed a population that more than doubled between the end of the Tokugawa era 
and World War Two.  
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In Hokkaido, as elsewhere in Japan, mechanization was sometimes adopted 
before actually being economically viable while there were often negative environmental 
consequences resulting from its implementation. Not everything attempted by either the 
Japanese or the foreign advisors was successful, though failure can often be just as 
educational. The Japanese had to take the methods and techniques of the outsiders first 
and make them their own through years of trial-and-error before ultimately finding 
success. 
Beginning in the Tokugawa period, Japan engaged in a territorial rivalry with 
Russia over Ezo/Hokkaido, the Kurils, Sakhalin, and Korea, which eventually developed 
into a bloody war in 1905. Though less contentious today, the ownership of the islands to 
the north of Hokkaido is still a debated issue. That this struggle was fought over lands 
upon which neither Russians nor Japanese traditionally lived was only seen as a minor 
issue. Acculturation in the Tokugawa period made the Hokkaido Ainu increasingly 
reliant on Japanese goods, while the Ainu themselves were forced to become ‘Japanese’ 
by law in 1899, a law only repealed in recent years. 
An examination of Hokkaido’s development also yields some insight not just into 
the motivations of Japanese colonialism, but also why Japan’s imperialism played out as 
it did. Patterns established in the development of Hokkaido were continued in modified 
forms throughout the Japanese Empire. Japanese cultural biases against peoples of 
different ethnicities, revealed in Japanese rule over Hokkaido’s Ainu, also were a factor 
in the treatment of colonized peoples. The peoples of Formosa and the Koreans were 
supposed to be assimilated, yet were still viewed by the Japanese as ‘others’ and only 
educated to the point of providing productive workers for the Japanese Empire, while the 
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few Japanese who immigrated to colonies kept themselves segregated from conquered 
subjects. That the Japanese were able to develop the agriculture, infrastructure, and 
economies of their colonies effectively and provide their own models of scientific 
agriculture to occupied lands showed that the lessons learned in the development of 
Hokkaido were paying off. Sakhalin, with similar conditions to Hokkaido, proved to be 
one of the more popular destinations for Japanese immigrants, as the Japanese were able 
to transport their successes easily to an island even further to the north. 
Much work on the development of Hokkaido and its larger role in Japan’s 
modernization and colonial empire that came can still be done. This thesis is an attempt 
to spur future scholarship in the direction of considering not just the island alone, but also 
its larger significance to Japan and the eventual Japanese empire. Hokkaido made the 
transition from outer to inner land, and so too should scholarship make Hokkaido an 
integral part of the standard Japanese history narrative. 
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